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I. INTRODUCTION
Is alternative dispute resolution (ADR) successful? Yes, no, and
maybe. The answer depends on why it is used and what it is supposed to
accomplish. Additionally, valuation of ADR depends on how its goals are
measured, how it compares to alternative procedures, and how it fits one's
conception of American justice. Given the increasing interest in ADR,1
answers regarding its success will affect allocation of both public and pri-
vate resources.
The term "ADR" encompasses many dispute resolution techniques.
Mediation, arbitration, summary jury trials (SJTs), early neutral evaluation
(ENE), and minitrials are several of the more familiar examples. ADR
may be public or private, voluntary or compulsory, costly or free. Its cli-
ents possess diverse demographic characteristics, and their experience
with ADR is likely to differ depending upon their background, experi-
ence, education, and expectations. The type of dispute involved will also
1. The American Bar Association is promoting ADR with its 1994 theme: "Justice for All-All
for Justice." R. William Ide III, Summoning Our Resolve, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 8 (1993). ADR is
considered necessary to this egalitarian theme because ADR works. Id.
The American Arbitration Association, a national nonprofit organization, reports that its 35
offices completed 7161 resolutions in 1991, an increase from 5386 in 1990 and 4801 in 1989. Steve
Kaufman, See You Out of Court, NATION's Bus., June 1992, at 58. Court-annexed arbitration
programs are operating in 21 states. Craig Boersema et al., State Court-Annexed Arbitration: What
Do Attorneys Think?, 75 JUDICATURE 28, 28 (1991). Ten federal district courts (E.D. Pa., M.D. Fla.,
W.D. Mo., W.D. Okla., N.D. Cal., W.D. Mich., D.N.J., W.D. Tex., E.D.N.Y., and M.D.N.C.) have
mandatory court-annexed arbitration programs funded by Congress. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DisTicr COURTS 1 (1990). See
generally, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, ARBITRATION AND THE LAW, AAA GENERAL
COUNSEL's ANNUAL REPORT 1991-1992 (1992); ABA Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution,
Legislation on Dispute Resolution, 1990/1991 Addendum (1992) (reviewing ADR legislation and
caselaw).
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affect the perceived result.2  These independent variables complicate any
attempt to predict ADR success.
The results, or outcomes, of ADR are not only difficult to predict,
but also difficult to measure. Current research has attempted to define
success by using such criteria as client satisfaction, pace of litigation,
increased options, caseload reduction, compliance, and long-term stabil-
ity.3 Time and cost savings are frequently accepted as valid measures of
success.4 Opinions of the bench and bar are solicited for appraisal of
ADR's practicality.5 Whether any of these criteria are valid for determin-
ing success is controverted.
Current studies of ADR have generated almost as many questions as
were initially addressed. Data on cost savings and efficiency is not com-
pelling. The desirability of promoting settlement, imposing preconditions
to court access, and granting neutrals decision-making power is chal-
lenged. Opinions about ADR range from enthusiastic support to dire pre-
dictions of institutionalizing a second class legal system.' Consequently,
due process, equal protection, and social policies regarding the aims of
ADR are being scrutinized.7 Whether ADR is an adequate solution to
perceived problems in the legal system, or whether it is needed at all, is
debated."
Obstacles in research design and methodology are frequently
encountered in social science research. The strongest studies utilize a
2. See David Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 381, 383 (1989) (advocating
consideration of the "'relevantly different' contexts" in which ADR occurs).
3. E.g., the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) evaluated 10 arbitration programs on cost, time, court
burden, fairness, and availability of additional methods. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 1.
Mediation reviews have emphasized assessment of client satisfaction, compliance rates, mediator
effectiveness, and disputants' learning as measures of effectiveness. Hugh O'Doherty & Faculty
Consortium on Dispute Resolution Research, Mediation Evaluation: Status Report and Challenges
for the Future, 10 EVALUATION PaGc. 8, 13-17 (1989).
4. E.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 953, 956-57 (1990).
5. See, e.g., John Barkai & Gene Kassebaum, Pushing the Limits on Court-Annexed Arbitration:
The Hawaii Experience, 14 JusT. Sys. J. 133, 141 (1991) (measuring satisfaction by assessing lawyers'
attitudes); see also Jay Folberg et al., Use of ADR in California Courts: Findings and Proposals, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 343, 364-66 (1992) (surveying judges' knowledge and use of ADR).
6. Critics worry that ADR may deprive disadvantaged groups of legal rights and compromise
legal ethics; advocates praise its efficiency (speed, cost, access) and commitment to a consensual
social order. Luban, supra note 2, at 381; Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored
ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They
Threaten Important Values, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 303, 304-06 (1990).
7. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Lucy V. Katz,
Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of
the Coin?, 1993 J. Disp. RESOL. 1 (1993).
8. See G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs, 75
JUDICATURE 34, 38 (1991). The legal "crisis" suggested as a justification for imposing mandatory
ADR does not exist. Id. But see Richard Danzig & Michael J. Lowy, Everyday Disputes and
Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 675, 691 (1975).
The lack of readily available, reasonably priced methods for settling disputes is costly for everyone.
Id.
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control group, but identifying controls and randomizing subjects is diffi-
cult.9 The task of selecting reliable and valid instruments for defining and
measuring program goals and the corresponding changes in behavior, atti-
tudes, and values of the subjects is challenging.' 0 Qualitative methods,
such as case studies and self-reports, provide perspective but also have
limited generalizability." These research caveats are applicable to
attempts to evaluate, measure, and predict the effects of ADR.
The value of evaluation lies in providing useful information to deci-
sion-makers and consumers.' 2  To measure success, evaluators must be
able to describe intended results and propose questions that will provide
the corresponding information.' 3 This is difficult as long as the concept
of ADR remains amorphous and ambiguous. 4 Until what is being mea-
sured is clarified and the right questions selected, data will be misleading,
irrelevant, and uninformative.
Regardless of one's initial perspective on ADR, determining its rela-
tive advantages and disadvantages will aid both advocates and detractors
in making informed choices. Much preliminary information is available.
Well-designed evaluations can focus that information, respond to con-
cerns, and guide fiscal and social policies. It can suggest appropriate,
attainable goals: "In short, if you know where you are going, you have a
better chance of getting there."'"
9. JACQUELINE KOSECOFF & ARLENE FINK, EVALUATION BASICS: A PRACTITIONER'S MANUAL
22 (1982). The control group is exposed to the trial program or service while a comparison group is
not. Id.
10. Id.
11. See MICHAEL A. PATrON, QUALITATIVE EVALUATION METHODS (1980) (describing
procedures for collecting and analyzing qualitative data for social science research); CAROL TAYLOR
FiTz-GIBBON & LYNN LYONS MORRIS, How TO DESIGN A PROGRAM EVALUATION (1978)
(recommending several practical designs for program evaluation).
12. KOSECOFF & FINK, supra note 9, at 20-21. "Evaluation is a set of procedures to appraise a
program's merit and to provide information about its goals, expectations, activites, outcomes, impact,
and costs." Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversay Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44 (1991). Descriptive words and labels
must be more precise in order to make accurate comparisons. Id. ADR has been described as a
"cloudy elephant--so big that it can not help attracting attention but so confusing that the legal
system cannot manage it. Stephenie Overman, Why Grapple with the Cloudily Elephant?, HR MAG.,
Mar. 1993, 60 (attributing the latter thought to attorney Lynn Laughlin, director of Employment
Dispute Resolution, Inc.).
15. ROBERT F. MAGER, PREPARING INSTRUCTIONAL OBJECTIVES 6 (2d ed. 1975) (describing
techniques for organizing instruction).
384 [Vol. 70:381
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II. MEDIATION
A. Is MEDIATION SUCCESSFUL?
1. Client Satisfaction
Client satisfaction is one criterion for measuring the success of medi-
ation programs. Typically, 75% or more of mediation participants report
being satisfied even when an agreement is not reached.' 6 Although satis-
faction is not easily quantified or comparable among different individuals,
data relates it to clients' perceived control of the process, privacy, and the
opportunity for expression of opinions.' 7 Satisfaction is also closely linked
with clients' perceptions of fairness, a finding that is confirmed in studies
of victim-offender mediations.'" The positive effects of participation in
such programs were attributed to the victim's opportunity to confront the
offender, express concerns, receive answers to questions, and negotiate a
restitution plan.' 9 Overall, involvement and the perception of fairness
were positively related. 0
A more extensive evaluation of victim-offender programs, consisting
of cross-state interviews of 868 victims and offenders, confirmed that vic-
tims participating in mediation were more satisfied than victims who did
not participate in mediation.2 ' Victims who participated in mediation
were significantly less disturbed about the crime and less fearful of its
being repeated.22 Both victims and offenders believed that mediation
enhanced fairness, and they perceived the juvenile justice system posi-
16. Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation of
Social Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION 394, 395-96 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds. 1989) [hereinafter A Research Perspective].
17. Id. at 396.
18. See Mark S. Umbreit, Crime Victims Seeking Fairness, Not Revenge: Toward Restorative
justice, 53 FED. PROBATION 52, 55 (1989). Fifty burglary victims referred to a victim-offender
mediation program, the Minnesota Victim Offender Reconciliation Project, were surveyed
concerning fairness and satisfaction. Id. at 52. One participant summarized the group consensus
stating. 'I think the more involved you are, the more satisfied you are that it has been taken care of
properly.'" Id. at 55.
19. Id at 55. It was important to negotiate the restitution agreement for 86% of the victims, to
personally meet the offender for 66% of the victims, to express their fears directly to the offender for
78% of the victims, and to receive answers about the crime for 76% of the victims. Id. at 55.
Restitution agreements were considered fair by 93% of the victims. Umbreit, supra note 18, at 56.
20. Id. at 55. Twice as many mediation participants thought the dispositions of their cases were
fair when compared to parties who refused to participate in mediation. Id. at 56. Being treated fairly
was reported by 97% otthose in the mediation sessions. Id. Victims participating in mediation also
reported high levels of satisfaction. Id. at 55. Meeting the offender was the most commonly
identified reason for satisfaction. Umbreit, supra note 18, at 56.
21. Mark Umbreit & Robert B. Coates, The Impact of Mediating Victim Offender Conflict: An
Analysis of Programs in Three States, 1992 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 21, 21-22 (1992) (describing the
victim-offender mediation programs affiliated with the juvenile courts in Albuerquerque, New
Mexico; Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota; and Oakland, California). Pre- and ost-mediation
interviews were administered to three groups: those referred to mediation but choosing not to
participate, groups not referred to mediation, and the mediation participants. Id. at 22. All groups
were matched for age, race, sex and offense. Id. The interviews addressed satisfaction, fairness, and
restitution completion. Id.
22. Id. at 24.
1994]
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tively.13  However, although the process was considered fair, offenders
did not indicate any greater satisfaction with the outcome of mediation
compared to results decreed by the court.24
Disenchantment with the adversarial process and its frustration of
cooperation and compliance has been suggested as one reason for the
dramatic increase in the number of divorce mediation programs.' These
programs consider client satisfaction an important outcome and have
been active in attempting to determine its antecedents. For example,
court programs in California, Connecticut, and Minnesota offering media-
tion services for contested child custody and visitation distributed and
analyzed identical client questionnaires.2 ' At all locations, users were
highly satisfied with mediation. Clients who reached agreements were
the most enthusiastic, but even a majority of those who did not reach
agreement would recommend mediation to others. 8 Considering the
needs of the children, providing an opportunity to vent grievances and
keeping discussions focused were the most appreciated features of
mediation.29
Numerous investigations have replicated the findings of greater cli-
ent satisfaction in mediation compared to litigation. 30  A Denver study
indicated that 77% of the parties were satisfied with mediation compared
23. Id. at 25.
24. Id. Offenders reported no significant difference in satisfaction with the justice system
whether they participated in the mediation or not. Id. at 24.
25. Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait of Client Reactions to Three
Court Mediation Programs, 23 CONCILIATION C'rs. REV. 1, 1 (1985) [hereinafter A Preliminary
Portrait] (citing Jessica Pearson et al., A Portrait of Divorce Mediation Services in the Public and
Private Sector, 21 CONCILATION CTS. REV. 1-24 (1983)); Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode,
Note, The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce, 86 YALE L.J., 104, 165-66 (1976)
(reporting that feelings of intimidation are minimized when lay assistants help with the divorce
process).
26. Pearson & Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait, supra note 25, at 2. This research was
sponsored by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health and Human Services
and included the Los Angeles Conciliation Court, the Family Relations Division of the Connecticut
Superior Court, and the Domestic Relations Division of the Hennepin County Family Court. Id. at
2. Demographics were similar across sites but reflected the general population of each area. Id. at 3.
Clients completed questionnaires prior to mediation, 15 weeks following the first contact, and 12
months later. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 6-7. Before mediation, 33 to 38% of the clients at all sites indicated great
dissatisfaction with their initial custody arrangements. Pearson & Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait,
supra note 25, at 3.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 7-8. Approximately 70% of the clients cited these factors. Id.
30. E.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation Research Results, in DIVORCE
MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 429, 437 (Jay Folberg & A. Milne eds., 1988) [hereinafter
Research Results]. The Divorce and Mediation Project, designed to assess comprehensive divorce
mediation in northern California, reported that 74% of both men and women completing mediation
would recommend the process to a friend. Joan B. Kelly & Lynn L. Gigy, Divorce Mediation:
Characteristics of Clients and Outcomes, MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION, 263, 278 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds, 1989).
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to less than 40% using an adversarial approach. 3' Degree of satisfaction
with the final divorce decree was significantly greater for a mediation
group compared to an adversarial group as reported on 101 mail question-
naires from Kansas and California. 2 Satisfaction with the mediation pro-
cess persists beyond settlement. In field studies using random
assignment, mediation participants were three times more likely to report
that the situation had improved six weeks following the settlement. 3 The
mediation process continued to be rated fairer and more satisfying than
adversary procedures when reevaluated six and twelve months later.34
Field studies have attempted to determine whether the antecedents
of satisfaction are different for men and women, as contrasting data has
been published regarding sex differences and mediation. Both men and
women report more satisfaction with mediation compared to litigation,
but aspects of the process are perceived and rated differently.3 A longi-
tudinal study examining the factors contributing to client satisfaction for
males and females found both groups significantly more satisfied with the
mediation process and outcomes than an adversarial group was with their
divorce.36 However, men in both groups were significantly more likely to
believe they had wasted time. 7 Men, more than women in both groups,
rated their attorneys or mediators as supporting their spouses' viewpoint
more than their own.3 s Women in the mediation sample were most likely
31. Pearson & Thoennes, Research Results, supra note 30, at 429. Research psychologists Kelly
and Gigy report a high percentage (78% of men and 72% of women) at least somewhat satisfied with
divorce me dation. Kely & Gigy, supra note 30, at 278.
32. Barbara J.Bautz, Divorce Mediation: For Better or for Worse?, 22 MEDIATION Q. 51, 55, 57
(1988). Bautz investigated the correlation between satisfaction with the final divorce and type of
divorce process-contested, uncontested, or mediated: Id. at 51-52.
33. Robert E. Emery & Melissa M. Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOcIsT 472, 474
(1987).
34. Nancy Pearson & Jessica Thoennes, The Mediation and Adjudication of Divorce Disputes:
Some Costs and Benefits, 4 FAM. ADVOC., Winter 1982, at 26, 31 [hereinafter Costs and Benefits].
Communication had improved. Id.; see also Nancy Pearson & Jessica Thoennes, Mediating and
Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L. Q. 497, 506 (1984) [hereinafter
Longitudinal Evaluation] (stating that better communications follow mediation).
35. See, e.g.. Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 474 (reporting sex differences). But see Joan B.
Kelly, Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Respondents' Perceptions of Their Processes and
Outcomes, 6 MEDIATION Q. 71, 86 (1989) (failing to replicate Emery's findings and describing both
sexes as equally satisfied with mediation overall).
36. Kelly, supra note 35, at 84. Two hundred twenty-five divorcing individuals comprised the
adversarial sample; 212 respondents represented the voluntary mediation participants. Id. at 73. The
samples were not randomly selected. Id. at 75. Both groups completed questionnaires at five points
in time. Id. at 73. At the final divorce, 69% of the mediation group was "somewhat" to "very
satisfied" compared to only 47% of the adversarial group. Id. at 84. Communication in the
adversarial group had deteriorated. Id at 82. Findings consistently favored mediation for reaching
comprehensive divorce agreements. Id. at 84. Except for child support, which was perceived as
inadequate by women in both groups, mediation was more satisfactory on all outcomes. Id. at 85. No
significant gender differences regarding satisfaction were found. Id.
37. Id. at 81.
38. Id.
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to report that the mediation process helped them assert themselves when
compared to adversarial women and men."9
Significant sex differences were found in a court-based mediation
study.40 Again, consistent and statistically significant differences favored
mediation over litigation.41 Yet, differences between groups were much
greater for fathers than mothers with the men significantly more satis-
fied.42  Women believed that children's needs were well-addressed in
mediation, but that they personally won more and lost less in litigation.43
A comparison of fifteen mediating families to sixteen litigating families
revealed similar findings.4 The mediation results were positive, but
mothers and fathers responded differently.' Fathers were more satisfied
with the process and the effect on themselves and their former spouse;
women were more satisfied with the effect on the children.46
Why is mediation more satisfactory for fathers compared to mothers?
The reported differences favoring fathers' satisfaction did not result from
womens' dissatisfaction with mediation.47 The disparity resulted from
comparing the two groups of men with the litigation group being very
displeased.48 Women won in litigation so mediation could not improve
39. Id. at 80. Women in mediation felt empowered and were confident that they had influenced
the agreement, id., suggesting that mediation was able to balance the relative power of the
participants. Id. at 85.
Critics of mediation are concerned that women may be disadvantaged in mediation because they
tically have less power and knowledge about the situation. Id. However, in this study, women in
the adversarial group did not express more satisfaction on any item than women in mediation. Id. at
85-86. Mediating women were as satisfied as men with the overall process and reported exerting as
much influence. Id. at 86. In a supporting study, women reported greater improvement in
psychological functioning and greater resolution of their disputes in mediation when compared to
litigation. Christopher W. Camplair & Arnold L. Stolberg, Benefits of Court-Sponsored Divorce
Mediation: A Study of Outcomes and Influences on Success, 7 MEDIATION Q. 199, 209 (1990).
40. Robert E. Emery & Joanne A. Jackson, The Charlottesville Mediation Project: Mediated and
Litigated Child Custody Disputes, 6 MEDIATION Q. 3, 12 (1989). Court-based mediation services
were evaluated by random assignment to mediation or traditional adversarial methods. Id. at 9.
Variables measured for the 71 families included the number of agreements, speed, content,
satisfaction, perceptions of the effect on themselves, their children, and former spouse, and three
measures of general postdivorce functioning. Id. at 10.
41. Id. at 11.
42. Id. at 12. Men in mediation were more satisfied with the process, with negotiations, and
with the psychological impact on themselves and their spouses than men who litigated. Id. at 12.
However, in this study, women in mediation reported less satisfaction than those in litigation.
Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 200.
43. Emery & Jackson, supra note 40, at 12.
44. Robert E. Emery et al., Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Further Evidence on the
Differing Views of Mothers and Fathers, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 410, 414 (1991).
45. Id. at 411. Mediation kept a substantial number of divorcing couples out of court, and
agreements were produced in less than half the time it took to litigate. Id. at 415. A statistically
significant and meaningful increase in satisfaction was noted for fathers. Id. at 410.
46. Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 474; Emery, supra note 44, at 410.
47. Emery & Jackson, supra note 40, at 12.
48. Id. at 12, 15. Satisfaction may be attributed to fathers' greater participation in the custody
decisions. Id at 16. However, the authors warn that these findings may only generalize to court
settings and to subjects from lower socioeconomic groups. Id.
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their results; results, however, could improve for fathers.49  Fathers tend
to benefit from social innovations, such as mediation, that alter the status
quo. If the topics mediated are areas in which mothers have been tradi-
tionally favored, such as custody and visitation, men are more likely to
report gains.50 If topics of concern to women, such as support and finan-
cial settlements, are mediated, a corresponding increase in women's satis-
faction should occur.5 1
Even in studies that report greater satisfaction for mediation partici-
pants, individual reactions vary. Group averages will thus not be accurate
predictors for specific clients.5 2 Some comments regarding dissatisfaction
with the mediation process included feeling tension, discomfort, and con-
fusion. 53 Others may have been unhappy due to faulty expectations of the
process. Misconceptions included the belief that mediation would save
the marriage, that the mediator would make the final custody decision, or
that mediation was a form of counseling.' False expectations are appar-
ently a widespread problem regardless of the content of the mediation. 55
Satisfaction may not always be the best criterion of success. It is
important, but difficult to measure, and its overemphasis may lead to min-
imizing other equally important goals. For example, mediation of special
education disputes has been considered successful.56  One extensive
49. Women have an advantage in litigation due to a custodial preference for mothers. Emery,
supra note 44, at 416. In fact, mothers won 90% of the litigated custody battles. Id. at 415.
50. Emery & 'wyer, supra note 33, at 475.
51. Actually, the custody agreements reached in litigated and mediated groups did not differ in
actual time spent with the children except that the mediated agreements provided for more joint legal
custody. Emery & Jackson, supra note 40, at 15-16. Barbara J. Bautz & Rose M. Hill, Divorce
Mediation in New Hampshire: A Voluntary Concept, 7 MEDIATION Q. 33, 37 (1989). Fathers may
have derived greater satisfaction from having their parental role recognized even if the actual results
did not differ. Id. In a state with the presumption of joint legal custody, mediation was more likely to
produce that result. Id.; see also Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 478.
52. See, e.g., Bautz & Hill, supra note 51, at 37. Although couples in mediation were
significantly more satisfied with the final divorce agreement than the adversarial couples, responses in
both ups ranged from "very satisfied" to "very dissatisfied." Id.
30. Pearson & Thoennes, Reseach Results, supra note 30, at 439. Approximately half of the
mediation participants agreed with the statements: "The sessions were tension-filled and unpleasant"
and "I felt angry during much of the session." Id. Feeling defensive was acknowleged by 45% of the
participants, and some were worried that the mediator would fail to detect dishonesty in their
spouses: "He's smart... he can do anything... I was afraid they (the mediators) would believe him."
He "did a better job of selling himself." Id.
54. Id. Approximatedly one-fourth agreed that "mediation was confusing." Id. Interviews
revealed that clients often distorted the purpose of mediation. Id.
55. See, e.g., Mary P. Van Hook, Resolving Conflict Between Farmers and Creditors: An
Analysis of the Farmer-Creditor Mediation Process, 8 MEDIATION Q. 63, 68 (1990). Lack of
experience with mediation led to expecting both too much and too little at times. Id. The Iowa
Farmer-Creditor Mediation Servies (IFCMS) randomly sampled farmers, representatives of financial
institutions, and mediators. Id. at 65. Lack of experience contributed to misunderstandings and
problems, e.g., farmers not knowing how to prepare for mediation and not bringing adequate
information to the sessions. Id. at 68-69.
56. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 668, 682 (1986). The majority of disputes have settled and parents' reactions are positive. Id.
(citing L. SINGER & E. NACE, MEDIATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: Two STATES' EXPERIENCES
(1985)).
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study, comparing the effectiveness of mediation as an alternative to tradi-
tional due process hearings for determining custodial placement, found
that mediation had a stronger correlation with parental satisfaction. 7
However, because there was no greater satisfaction with the outcome
from mediation than from litigation, no higher rating of approval with the
school personnel, and no lowered financial cost, the study concluded that
mediation was not achieving its potential as an effective method of con-
flict resolution in special education.58 Thus, even if the parties are satis-
fied, the dispute may not be efficiently or effectively resolved. Other
quantitative and qualitative measures can provide additional information
and may be necessary to complement satisfaction as criteria of success.
2. Settlement Rate
Reported settlement rates achieved in mediation vary greatly.5 9
Conservative estimates for settlement in all types of mediation range
between 20% and 80% with a median rate of 60%.60 These figures are
consistent with those reported in the divorce mediation literature.'
Mandatory farm mediation programs produce comparable settlement
rates and have been judged successful. 62 Generally, court programs settle
from one-half to three-quarters of the cases referred to mediation.6
57. H.R. Turnbull H.R. & Kathleen H. McGinley, Evaluating the Effectiveness of Mediation as
an Alternative in the Due Process Theory in Special Education, Final Report, 9/1/86-8/31/87 (ED
345422) at 142. A parent satisfaction survey was administered to parents of children disagreeing with
school placements. Id. at 155.
58. Id. at 170, 195. Although satisfaction with the process was high, the parents' previous
relationship with the school was critical for both groups. Id. at 158. The authors suggest that
mediation in special education suffers from ineffective implementation and lack of nationwide
uniformity. Id. at 195.
59. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 397.
60. id.
61. See Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 208. Sixty-nine percent of the couples in
mediation resolved at least one dispute, and over one-third successfullyresolved all disputes. Id. See
also Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 474. More cases were settled in mediation than through
attorney negotiations in three quasi-experimental field studies. Id. But see Pearson & Thoennes, A
Preliminary Portrait, supra note 25, at 9. Only 35-40% reached agreement. Id. However, even this
lower rate was augmented by another 20-30% reaching some type of agreement, perhaps temporary.
Id.
62. Bureau of National Affairs, Farmer-Lender Debt Mediation is Growing in Midwest States, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES 126, 128 (Martha A. Matthews
ed., 1990) [hereinafter Debt Mediation]. A report of mandatory mediation documented a 50%
settlement rate in Minnesota, most involving 3 to 4 creditors, id. at 126, and a 62% settlement rate in
Iowa. Id. at 127.
63. Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 474. In Los Angeles County, 55% of the 500 couples
entering divorce mediation each month reach an agreement. Id. (citing H. Mclsaac, Court-
Connected Mediation, 21 CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 49-56 (1985)). In Connecticut, where referral is
at judicial discretion, 64% have reached agreement. Id. (citing A.J. SALIUM & S.D. MARUZE, The Use
of Mediation in Contested Child Custody and Visitation Disputes (1982) (unpublished manuscript)
(1982)). Smaller public mediation services report reaching agreements in one-half to three-quarters
of their cases. Id. at 474 (citing H.H. Irving, et al., Final Research Report, Toronto, Canada:
Provincial Court (Family Division)); Pearson & Thoennes, Costs and Benefits, supra note 34, at 28-
29.
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Reliance on settlement rates as an indication of success may be mis-
placed. Rates are inflated for various reasons, and reports may be inaccu-
rate. One-third of the parties reaching an agreement in a divorce
mediation still insisted that they made little or no progress.' On the
other hand, there may be more success than indicated by the settlement
numbers because clients who fail to reach an understanding during the
mediation sessions may eventually complete an agreement.65
3. Efficiency
The available evidence suggests that mediated cases settle more
quickly than comparable cases using an adversarial approach.' In child
custody settlements, with random assignment to either mediation or liti-
gation, settlement time for the mediation group was significantly
shorter.6 7 A review of mediations for minor disputes indicated that reso-
lution occurred considerably faster than court hearings could be held.6 8
Advocates claim that mediation may permit a more complete examination
of issues than that usually allowed in court. 9 When a thorough analysis is
quicker, time and effort are saved for both litigants and the public.70
Resolving disputes quickly can lead to a reduction in the number of
cases actually litigated. 7 ' Trial judges hearing divorce cases in McLean
County, Illinois, agreed that mediation led to a significant reduction in the
64. Pearson & Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait, supra note 25, at 13.
65. Debt Mediation, supra note 62, at 127.
66. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 398.
67. Emery & Jackson, supra note 40, at 11. Mediation took an average of three weeks to reach a
settlement, compared to seven weeks for the adversarial group. Id. The amount of time required for
mediation varies. Id. at 6. Court programs in Minnesota for custody and visitation typically average
4.3 hours spread over an average of 3.3 mediation sessions. In California, the same type o program
averages 1.7 sessions lasting a total of 3 hours. Connecticut averages 2.3 hours, which take an average
of 1.5 sessions. Id. Only 21% of the respondents in Minnesota attended one session, compared to
57% in California and 65% in Connecticut. Id.
The time required to complete mediation also varied at each site depending upon the individual
case. E.g., Lynelle C. Hale & James A. Knecht, Enriching Divorced Families Through Grass Roots
Development of Community-Wide Court-Referred Mediation Services, 24 CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 7,
12 (1986). Twenty-nine cases studied in McLean County, Illinois following the first year of court-
referred mediation services required from .5 to 25 weeks to complete, with an average of 4.7 weeks.
Id. The actual number of sessions ranged from of 1 to 9, with an average of 2.8 sessions for the
mediation. Id.
68. Janice A. Roehl & Royer F. Cook, Mediation in Interpersonal Disputes: Effectiveness and
Limitations, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION, supra note 16, at 31, 33. Reports disputing the relative speed of mediation have
tended to compare the time interval between intake and mediation to the interval between intake and
dismissal. Id. at 34. It would be more appropriate to compare the time between intake and
mediation to the time between intake and trial because many cases are dismissed early, distorting the
comparison. Id.
69. Kent E. Menzel, Judging the Fairness of Mediation: A Critical Framework, 9 MEDIATIONQ. 3, 9 (1991) (citing R. Albert and D. Howard, Informal Dispute Resolution Through Mediation, in
EVALUATIVE CRITERIA AND OUTCOMES IN DIVORCE MEDIATION 100 (J. A. Lemmon ed., 1985)).
70. Menzel, supra note 69, at 10. If the process can be completed in a shorter time without
sacrificing completeness, a better solution with less stress will be more likely. Id.
71. Id. at 9.
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number of trials scheduled. 2 Diversion of cases from court proceedings
by mediation is substantial; 73 however, results on reducing court backlogs
are not all positive.7 4 Less than optimal results have been attributed to
lack of popular support for using mediation, an attraction of cases that
would not have been initiated as legal actions, and time expended mediat-
ing cases that would have been dismissed at an early stage. 75 Between
one-third and two-thirds of offers to enter mediation are refused, thereby
preventing an accurate estimation of the number of cases that might be
successfully diverted.76
4. Cost
In general, mediation should reduce the cost of resolving disputes.
Cost savings appear to be more pronounced for public entities compared
to private parties. For example, the city of Los Angeles reported savings
of approximately $175,000 in 1978 with mandatory custody mediation.78
For litigants, results have varied. Significant cost savings with media-
tion have been documented, but other studies have reported only modest
savings.79 Cost savings may depend on the type of dispute. 0 Overall,
successful mediation appears to save costs, while unsuccessful mediation
does not necessarily increase costs.81
72. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 15. Most referrals were voluntary rather than court-
ordered. Id.
73. Emery, supra note 44, at 414.
74. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 398.
75. Kenneth Kressel & Dean C. Pruitt, Themes in the Mediation of Social Conflict, 41(2) J. Soc.
IssuEs 179, 182-83 (1985) [hereinafter Themes].
76. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 399. This refusal rate is
consistent even when mediation is offered at little or no cost. Id.
77. Speed in attaining settlement makes divorce cheaper. E.g., Pearson & Thoennes,
Longitudinal Evaluation, supra note 34, at 507-08.
78. Kressel & Pruitt, Themes, supra note 75, at 182.
79. See Joan B. Kelly, Is Mediation Less Expensive? Comparison of Mediated and Adversarial
Divorce Costs, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 19 (1990) (reporting significant savings, e.g., $12,226 for
adversarial divorces compared to $5,234 for mediated divorces). But see Pearson & Thoennes,
Research Results, supra note 30, at 447 (indicating only modest savings).
80. See, e.g., Bureau of National Affairs, Manager of Community Relations Unit in Arizona
Describes State Mediation of Civil Rights Cases, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE
AND PERSPECTIVES, 119, 121 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990). The Civil Rights Division of the
Arizona Attorney Gereral's Office referred nearly 300 discrimination charges to mediation and
concluded that the process was cost effective. Id. at 119. Of three hundred cases referred, 276
discrimination charges were mediated. Id. at 121. A total of 181 charges were successfully resolved,
awarding an average of $3,635.79 per claim. Id. However, reviews of other types of programs,
including both neighborhood justice centers and environmental mediation programs, have concluded
that cost effectiveness is difficult to measure, and cost savings may not necessarily be realized with
mediation. Roehl & Cook, supra note 68, at 39; Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note
16, at 398 (citing C. BINCHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE
(1986)).
81. Pearson & Thoennes, Research Results, supra note 30, at 447.
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5. Content
Mediated agreements may involve more compromise and more
equal apportionment of resources than adjudicated agreements. Settle-
ments are described as "very" to "somewhat fair" by couples in mediation,
while adversarial groups report "somewhat fair" to "very unfair" settle-
ments.82 Divorce mediation clients are more likely to report acceptance
of the idea of receiving their spouses' settlement as their own. 3 In small
claims cases, a study found awards were made solely to plaintiffs in only
17% of the mediated cases compared to almost 50% of adjudicated deci-
sions.84 Thus, it appears that fewer imbalanced agreements are reached
in mediation.
Won-lost ratings are more divergent for litigation couples and more
alike for mediation couples. 5  In mediation groups, both parties
described their winning and losing closer to the midpoints of a scale,
whereas ratings were at the extremes for litigation groups. 86 In litigation,
the more one parent felt like a winner, the more the other felt like a loser.
In mediation, the more one parent felt like a winner, the more the other
felt the same.87 The win-lose orientation of litigation and the win-win
orientation of mediation have been notably consistent.88 As opposed to
traditional litigators, mediators may be predisposed to empower everyone
to win and thus, agreements may reflect more balance. Or, by encourag-
ing communication, mediation may encourage expression of each party's
most important issues and facilitate winning for both when compromise is
possible.
82. Bautz & Hill, supra note 51, at 37-39. Mediation is voluntary in New Hampshire. Id. at 33.
A mail survey queried 500 randomly selected families, including both mediating and nonmediating
couples. Id. at 35. Thirty-two percent responded. Id.
83. Kelly, supra note 35, at 83. These responses suggest perceived equity. Id.
84. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 397-98. However, pressure to
settle may lead topost-mediation dissatisfaction. Id. In small claims cases, clients felt compelled to
settle as a result of"strong-arm tactics." Id. (citing N. Vidmar, An Assessment of Mediation in a Small
Claims Court, 411. SoC. IssuEs 127, 136 (1985)). Approximately 25% to 50% of the clients in
divorce mediation have reported experiencing pressure to settle. Id. at 398. Less powerful groups
may be more susceptible to coercion. While not describing the mediators' tactics as coercive, women
have reported that mediators control the terms of the agreement. Pearson & Thoennes, Research
Results, supra note 30, at 441. However, evidence on whether court forums are better at protecting
the rights of the disadvantaged when compared to mediation is inconclusive and contradictory.
Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 399.
85. Emery & Jackson, supra note 40, at 12.
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6. Impact on Psychological Functioning
Although mediation is popular in family disputes, the effects on the
family are not well documented. 9 Theoretically, mediation should elicit
behaviors that are conducive to cooperation and communication, and
couples in mediation do demonstrate gains in cooperationf ° Clients
attaining agreements of any type credit mediation with improving their
relationship with their ex-spouse.9' Couples who used mediation
described their post-divorce relationships as harmonious, whereas couples
who used traditional methods more frequently reported their relationship
as uncomfortable. 2 Subjective reports have indicated that parties using
mediation are more likely to be satisfied and to sense improvement in
their lives compared to those in the adversarial process. 3 This is true
even when baseline differences measuring marital conflict and tension are
similar.'
Parents participating in mediation were significantly more likely to
report that custody and visitation were better for the entire family than
parents participating in the adversarial process. 95 Positive changes fol-
lowed mediation, including parents experiencing less hostility toward fam-
ily members and spending more time with the children. Children
whose parents mediated their divorces seemed to adjust better than chil-
dren whose parents divorce through the adversarial process.9
89. Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 199. Research assessing the effect of mediation on
family adjustment is limited. Id. at 200.
90. Pearson & Thoennes, Research Results, supra note 30, at 443.
91. Pearson & Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait, supra note 25, at 9.
92. Bautz & Hill, supra note 51, at 39.
93. Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 474.
94. Kelly, supra note 35, at 75. Few initial differences on measurements of marital conflict and
tension were reported contradicting presumptions that couples choosing mediation are less angry and
more cooperative. Id.
95. Id. at 83.
96. Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 200-01. Camplair and Stolberg studied 76 divorcing
couples assigned either to mediation or litigation for the resolution of their child custody disputes. I.
at 201. The couples completed tests measuring co-parenting and family functioning before and after
the intervention. Id. at 202-03. There were no differences in initial behaviors, but mediation couples
presented more disputes of greater severity. Id. at 206.
97. Menzel, supra note 69, at 12 (citing D. Stull & N. Kaplan, The Positive Impact of Divorce
Mediation on Children's Behavior, in NEw INSICHTS INTO FAMILY MEDIATION (J.A. Lemmon ed.,
1987)). Significant differences in the behavior of children whose parents mediated their divorce
compared to children whose parents divorced through the adversarial process have also been noted.
Id. After an adversarial divorce, the oldest was "less likely to get involved in school activities, less
likely to interact with others outside of school, but more likely to use drugs and more likely to break
the law . . . than child 1 [oldest] of a parent who went throught mediation." Id. For the youngest
child, Stull and Kaplan found that children whose parents did not mediate were "less likely to do well
in school but more likely to show affection to the respondent." Id. But see Pearson & Thoennes,
Research Results, supra note 30, at 445-46 (fimding no statistical differences on behavioral checklist
ratings between children whose parents mediated or litigated, but suggesting that reports favoring the
effects of mediation on children are encouraging and they recommend larger sample sizes to better
test this hypothesis).
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Other studies have concluded that mediation was not significantly
more effective in reducing stress and dysfunction. 8 In one study, stan-
dardized psychological tests were administered to clients in either media-
tion or traditional litigation at the beginning of a study, at the completion
of mediation, and six months later. The study found that psychological
changes were attributed to the passage of time and not to the type of
intervention. 10 Other studies have also reported that mediation does not
lead to improvement in the psychological functioning of divorcing spouses
and that mediation produces only slight changes in relationship pat-
terns.' ° ' Perhaps the mediation process is too short, problems too
ingrained, and the situation too stressful for measurable or long-lasting
changes to occur.'0 2
7. Compliance
Data strongly suggests that mediation agreements foster compliance
and long-term stability.'0 3 Compliance is reported to be 67% to 87% in
neighborhood mediation centers.' 4 In a small claims sample, full compli-
ance has been obtained in 81% of the mediations compared to 48% of
adjudications. 10 5 "[F]ailure to pay anything is ... four times as likely in
adjudicated [cases] as ... [compared to] mediated cases." 106 Compliance
may be greater in mediation due to specification of details in mediated
settlements, smaller settlements, or perceived fairness.0 7
98. Joan B. Kelly et a], Mediated and Adversarial Divorce: Initial Findings From A
Longitudinal Study, in DIVORCE MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 465 (Jay Folberg & A. Milne
eds., 1988).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 466. Mediation was slightly, but not significantly, better at reducing anger. Id.
101. See Pearson & Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait, supra note 25, at 13. One-third of the
participants reaching permanent agreements reported that conflict and lack of progress continued.
Id. Approximately half characterize the mediation sessions as tension-filled. Id.
102. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspeive, supra note 16, at 399; Menzel, supra note 69, at
16. Agreements may be maintained, but only with difficulty and frustration. Menzel, supra note 69,
at 16 (reporting a study by M. Brotsky et al., Joint Custody Through Mediation-Reviewed: Parents
Assess Their Adjustment 18 Months Later, 26 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 53-58 (1988)). Of 48
mediated agreements one year after divorce, 20 agreements were maintained only with conflict. Id.
Only 12 agreements were maintained with a minimum level of stress, and 15 couples had failed to
achieve an agreement at all. Id.
103. Menzel, supra note 69, at 8.
104. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 396.
105. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Consensual
Processes and Outcomes, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-
PARTY INTERVENTION 53, 55 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989). Partial compliance is reported for
93% of mediated cases compared to 67% of adjudicated cases. Id. at 56.
106. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAw & Soc. REV. 11, 20 (1984).
107. McEwen & Maiman, supra note 105, at 58-59.
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Of particular interest in mediated custody disputes is compliance
with payment of child support.' 08 Again, evidence regarding mediation is
generally favorable. One study reported that 97% of parents whose child
support was determined in mediation made all payments." ° The litigated
group reported late or no payments at the significantly higher rate of
37%.1o Similar positive results have been reported for spousal support
payments."'
Recidivation is less likely for juveniles in mediated criminal justice
programs." 2 Offenders who negotiated restitution plans were more likely
to fulfill their obligations than offenders who were ordered to pay."'
Mediated agreements appear to produce compliance based on perceived
fairness rather than on penalties for noncompliance." 4 Increased compli-
ance with restitution plans may also result from participation in develop-
ing the plan and from- direct involvement with the victim."
5
Stability is also enhanced with mediated agreements. Full compli-
ance occurred in 79% of mediated settlements compared to 67% of
adversarial settlements." 6 Later, 33% of this adversarial group reported
serious disagreements over their settlement compared to only 6% of the
mediated group. 117 Repeated measures at six months and one year indi-
cated that clients were more likely to have adhered to mediated agree-
ments.1 8 In a major review of mediation research, no data on relitigation
is reported to be less favorable following mediation," 9 lending support to
108. Only half of the women who were owed child support in 1989 received the full amount.
Margaret C. Haynes, Understanding the Guidelines and the Rules, 16 FAM. ADvoc. 14, 17 (1993)
(citing U.S. Census Bureau, Child Support and Alimony: 1989 (Sept. 1991)).
109. Bautz & Hill, supra note 51, at 37. For a description of the study, see id. at 34-35.
110. Id. at 37. Support payments required for both groups did not differ significantly. Id. at 39.
111. See Pearson & Thoennes, Research Results, supra note 30, at 441. Subsequent reports in
the Denver Custody Mediation Project, id. at 429, indicated that 79% of clients with mediated
agreements reported full compliance with all terms. Id. at 441. However, the authors warn that
initial conditions may influence the relatively high success rate. Id.
112. E.g., Menzel, supra note 69, at 10.
113. Umbreit & Coates, supra note 21, at 26. Restitution compliance was analyzed by
comparing groups matched on age, race, sex, offense, and restitution amount. Id. at 22.
114. Menzel, supra note 69, at 8.
115. Umbreit & Coates, supra note 21, at 26. Acknowledging the victim as a person may lead to
greater awareness of the consequences of the crime. Id.
116. Pearson & Thoennes, Research Results, supra note 30, at 441. When data for the two
groups was adjusted by a measurement of initial cooperation, the results were less compelling but still
consistent. Id.
117. Id.
118. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 12, 14. This court-referred program requires a minimum
of three hours of mediation for all contested custody/visitation cases before a court hearing may be
scheduled. Id. at 11. In another study, at two years following mediation, only 13% of the mediation
participants sought court modifications, compared to 35% of the adversarial clients. Pearson &
Thoennes, Research Results, supra note 30, at 442.
119. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 396.
396
ADR: To BE OR ... ?
the contention that both compliance and long-term stability are associated
with mediation agreements.
120
B. ATTITUDES OF THE BENCH AND BAR
1. Attorneys
Six months after the initiation of a court-referred mediation service,
eighteen family law attorneys were interviewed. 12 1 Results were generally
positive and comments suggested that even when agreements were not
reached, issues were clarified and anger dissipated. 122 Confirming these
results, another survey of thirty-five attorneys indicated that 90% of the
attorneys were happy with mediation compared to a 50% satisfaction rate
following litigation without or after mediation. 2 3
Of the positive aspects of mediation, its impact on clients' emotional
well-being was rated highest. Attorneys reported that conflict in parent-
ing styles following the divorce was reduced, emotions were expressed,
mediation time provided a cooling-off period, and trauma for the entire
family was reduced. Clients also complied with the mediated agreement
which reduced the possibility of renewed strife for both parties. 2 4
Attorneys' negative comments about mediation are that delay may
deny clients access to the legal system; temporary hearings, which some-
times influence the final outcome unfairly, remain necessary; the trial is
an additional expense if settlement is not reached; some mediators are
inadequate; and policies for referral, screening, and exemptions are fre-
quently lacking.1' Ethical concerns include mediators' giving legal
120. E.g., Menzel, supra note 69, at 8. Menzel suggests that fairness may be partially assessed
by compliance. Id.
121. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 13. This court-referred program was initiated in 1985, id.
at 11, and evaluated after 6 months using case termination records and personal interviews. Id. at 12-
13.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Leland C. Swenson & D. Heinish, Attorney and Parent Attitudes Related to Successful
Mediation Counseling in Child Custody Disputes 2-3 (Apr. 23-26, 1987) (paper presented at the
Annual Meeting of the Western Psychological Ass'n, 7th, Long Beach, CA, microfiche ED279923).
They surveyed 48 clients, 35 attorneys, and 4 mediators at conciliation court offices in Los Angeles.
Id. at 4.
124. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 14.
125. Id. at 14. Attorneys participating in farmer-creditor mediation reflect the dichotomy in
opinions. Some who have represented farmers as well as creditors suggest that the farm mediation
program is unnecessary-that both parties were negotiating debts before mediation was tried and will
continue to do so. Bureau of National Affairs, Farmers' and Lenders' Attorneys Discuss Pros and
Cons of Mandatory Mediation, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES
129, 129 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990). An attorney in Olivia, Minnesota, stated that mediation
only postponed the inevitable, and a waiting prod might produce the same results. Id. at 130. The
process just becomes more expensive as debtors and creditors need attorneys for assistance. Id.
Even when trying to help, mediators do not structure the sessions well. In contrast, a Redwood Falls,
Minnesota, attorney stated that mediation shortened the time required for such cases and reduced
costs. Id. "They [farmers] were in a one-down situation .... [tjo say mediation wasn't necessary
because the two sides were talking anyway is basically baloney." Id. at 131.
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advice, lack of confidentiality, and judges' shifting their work to the
mediators.'2 6
Attorneys suggested that mediation should be voluntary, that courts
should monitor progress so that it cannot be used as a delay tactic, that
judges should use a consistent referral policy, and that procedures should
be standardized. 127  Due to concerns about privacy and confidentiality,
the possibility that ethical standards should include all participants, rather
than focus on mediators and parties, has been raised.'12
Attorney attitudes are important to the implementation and success-
ful use of mediation. Clients whose attorneys have positive attitudes
toward the process are more likely to emulate these beliefs and to negoti-
ate successfully. 29 Thus, there is a need for attorneys to be aware of their
comments and the impressions they project.13 ° Whether attorneys are
actually willing to encourage mediation is not certain.' 3 1 Several incen-
tives for their doing so include solidifying bench and bar relationships for
professional advantage, increasing their knowledge of court policies, and
improving client advocacy.'32
2. Judicial Input
Judges familiar with mediation consider it effective for educating cli-
ents about the relative costs and benefits of settlement compared to litiga-
tion, for evaluating the potential of a case, and for adapting settlements to
meet individual needs.3 Many judges consider mediation appropriate
for all types of civil cases, especially those in which the potential costs of
litigation are greater than the amount in controversy. 34  Frequently,
these happen to be cases with high rates of occurrence.1'5 Additionally,
126. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 14. Similar concerns were echoed by attorneys in other
interviews, especially doubts about confidentially. Attorneys questioned whether the focus on
confidentiality was sufficient and whether the lack of written records will foreclose examination of the
negotiations. Jennifer A. Mastrofski, Reexamination of the Bar Incentives to Support Custody
Mediation, 9 MEDIATION Q. 21, 29 (1991). Mastrofski interviewed judges, mediators, attorneys, court
administrators, and participants in family-court reform. Id. at 22-23. Forty-two interviewees were
attorneys. Id. at 23. Related to confidentiality concerns were the questions of whether mediation is
formal discovery and how confidentiality may be assured given that parties may learn new
information. Id. at 28.
127. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 14.
128. Mastrofski, supra note 126, at 29.
129. Swenson & Heinish, supra note 123, at 14. In fact, attorney attitudes are critical. Id.
130. Id. at 14-15.
131. See Mastrofski, supra note 126, at 29-30 (addressing the problem of lawyers' experiencing
territorial threat).
132. Id. at 29-30.
133. Folberg, supra note 5, at 365. Questionnaires were sent to all trial judges in California over
a three-month period to assess attitudes toward ADR. Id. at 355.
134. Id. at 366.
135. Id. These include landlord-tenant, small claims, civil harassment, and debt collection. Id.
[Vol. 70:381
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some trials are avoided by mediation lightening judges' schedules and
resulting in cost savings.
136
Although mediation is perceived favorably, judges have expressed
some concerns. First, they were concerned that the mediation process is
not as restrictive as is the courtroom with its procedural safeguards.
131
Time delays were considered a potential problem.'13  Support for promot-
ing pre-filing mediation was almost unanimous but was offset by concerns
about starting the process before discovery.' 39 When mediation resulted
from judicial intervention, judges wanted the results registered with the
court to preserve a record and to assist implementation. 40 Guaranteeing
the quality of mediation services was also important.'
4
'
Many judges were concerned about the resulting public perception
of the judicial system if mediation were to be used more than minimally.
Thirty percent of the judges responding to a survey thought that if media-
tion is required or suggested for only smaller or pro se cases, it might be
considered second-class justice; but if it were suggested only for those
who could afford to pay more, the courts might be perceived as being




The success of mediation is difficult to assess given the limitations in
methodology and research design common in much of the published liter-
ature. Random assignment and use of matched samples is frequently
impossible or not attempted. Participation is voluntary and self-reports
136. Hale & Knecht, supra note 67, at 14.
137. However, in certain situations this may be an advantage: "The court system is not designed
to solve the angry feelings between two families. It's like Joe Friday says, 'the facts ma'am, just the
facts."' Bureau of National Affairs, Mediator Stabilizes Violent Dispute Between Families After Court
Referral, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVEs 7, 9 (Martha A.
Matthews ed., 1990). For example, a neighborhood dispute was referred to the Center for Dispute
Settlement in Rochester, New York when "the legal system just didn't work." The neighborhood
dispute originally began as a minor dispute over music and eventually included 86 criminal charges.
Id. at 7. Personal injuries included a miscarriage and the accidental shooting of a bystander. Id.
Despite the series of events that had occured, the parties called a truce following mediation. Id. at 8.
138. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 369. Judges were in favor of beginning the mediation as soon
as possible. Id.
139. Id. at 369. Judges did not want mediation to conflict with statute of limitation
requirements or delay access to the court. Id. at 369-70.
140. Id. at 366-67.
141. Id. at 368. Judges measured quality by the percentage of cases resolved, client satisfaction,
and impressions of the local bench and bar. Id.
142. Id. at 367. Several judges were concerned about additional cost, especially after paying the
initial filing fee. Id. On the other hand, if parties cannot afford representation, they are benefited by
the intercession of mediators. Id.
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are prevalent.14 Longitudinal studies are rare and long-term follow-up is
nonexistent.'" Most research has examined private rather than court-
ordered mediation.14 5 However, public clients may have different charac-
teristics and attitudes than private clientele. In the court-mandated pro-
grams, results obtained in one jurisdiction may not generalize to another
location or type of program.' 46 It is encouraging that similar accounts of
satisfaction have been reported for various mediated topics; however, ran-
dom assignment, matched groups, longitudinal data, comparison of public
mediation versus private mediation, and examination of different locations
would enhance the reliability of the data obtained.
Mediation programs have established methods for collecting evalua-
tion data, but the data is incomplete and unstandardized so that compari-
son of results will not be effective.14 7  Effectiveness is generally
categorized by measures of satisfaction, compliance rates, mediator effec-
tiveness, and client learning. These criteria, however, do not provide a
complete measure of success. Although client satisfaction is intuitively an
important attribute of a successful process, it may be overrated. Satisfac-
tion may be unrelated to the actual outcome or not based on a realistic
appraisal of alternative solutions. Satisfaction may reflect avoidance of a
less preferable alternative or distrust of the legal system. Moreover, "sat-
isfaction" as a category in interviews and surveys is often undefined.
Settlement rates are used as a criterion of success on the assumption
that settlement is beneficial and programs with higher rates are better.
This, however, may not be the case. 148 Attaining an agreement may not
represent a solution to the problem because conflict and dissatisfaction
may continue.' 4 9 Supporters of mediation promise low cost and effi-
ciency, but, although desirable, these attributes are not inherently fair.' 50
Attempts to save money and time may rush the process and value settle-
ment at the expense of thoroughness. There is little data on long-term
compliance or noncompliance and the factors influencing both.' 5 '
143. E.g., Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at 475 (recommending caution in interpreting field
studies of client satisfaction).
144. E.g., Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 211-12 (discussing methodological limitations
in their study).
145. Kelly, supra note 35, at 71.
146. E.g., id. at 86-87.
147. O'Doherty, supra note 3, at 12-13. Interviews of 95 mediation program directors in 25
states indicated that only 39 programs systematically collected written evaluations, including
descriptive data such as demographics of the users. Id.
148. Pearson & Thoennes, A Preliminary Portrait, supra note 25, at 9.
149. Id. The issues are so personally difficult for some participants that no satisfactory
agreement is possible. Id.
150. Menzel, supra note 69, at 9.
151. O'Doherty, supra note 3, at 14-15.
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One criticism of program evaluations is that the data is helpful but
incomplete and nonspecific.'" 2 For example, questions concerning the
reasonableness of agreements frequently do not define "reasonable" or
simply elicit personal definitions of the term.1 53 Another criticism is that
feedback is not provided to the mediators. Frequently, in response to
difficulties, the mediator is simply not asked to participate again rather
than attempting to correct the mediator's inadequacy. 5 4
2. Discussion
Is mediation successful? A blend of quantitative and qualitative stan-
dards for measuring success would provide the most useful information
for answering this query. Rather than judging success on the basis of the
number of agreements reached, some qualitative evaluation of the settle-
ments should be available. This would require developing a standard for
examining agreements to assess specifically whether there are benefits for
the litigants and the public." Settlements should not be promoted or
discouraged but rather, should be monitored to find ways to encourage
settlements encompassing qualities that are deemed desirable.' 56
Evidence indicates that when compared to litigation, mediation may
be superior in areas of compliance, cost, efficiency, and agreement stabil-
ity. Mediation advocates assume that better communication and emo-
tional catharsis will relieve stress and improve the attitudes of the parties.
However, access to justice, improvement in relationships, and psychologi-
cal effects are unsubstantiated and need tobe more fully investigated. 157
A consideration of the conditions making mediation advisable would
add to its effective use. Procedural and substantive outcomes contribute
to the fairness of mediation. 15  Both are influenced by factors which may
not be negotiable or even acknowledged. These include public influ-
ences, such as case and statutory law, and private influences, such as fam-
ily norms, religious beliefs, and specific family needs. Better
152. Id. at 15. For example, when parties indicate feeling discomfort during the mediation
sessions, they are not specificalFy asked whether the feelings are attributable to characteristics of the
mediator or to aspects of the mediation process. Id. Similarly, if new skills are learned, participants
are not asked for a description. Id. at 16.
153. Id. at 14.
154. O'Doherty, supra note 3, at 16.
155. Menzel proposes a number of variables to be used for defining and measuring "fairness."
Menzel, supra note 70, at 17.
156. Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J. DISPUTE REs. 55, 83 (1988).
157. Kelly et al, supra note 98. The lack of reseach addressing these claims precipitated Kelly's
study. Id. The authors concluded that mediation has a beneficial impact on the future relationship of
the spouses rather than producing any immediate improvement in the current situation. Id. at 472.
158. Procedural outcomes refer to the process of reaching an agreement and include assessing
the impartiality of the mediator, the access to data, the degree of disclosure, and the relative power of
the parties. John Dworkin and William London, What is a Fair Agreement?, 7 MEDIATION Q. 3, 5-6
(1989). Substantive outcomes include the number of disputes resolved, the content of any agreement
reached, and the decisions regarding implementation. Id. at 6-7.
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understanding of these influences and corresponding pressures should
improve the process of mediation and the resulting agreements.
Factors such as the importance of the dispute and the willingness to
compromise may be linked to success. 51 If these can be assessed prior to
implementation, better referral and more accurate expectations of the
process can be expected. Clients are often confused about what media-
tion is supposed to do, and client education may help eliminate false
expectations. It may also help identify the couples that could benefit the
most from mediation. Couples with fewer and less troubling issues may
choose traditional adversarial methods, while couples who choose to
mediate may want to present a wide range of problems to maximize the
benefits of compromise."
Mediation can be viewed as part of a trend toward the "private
ordering" of divorce. 16 1 As a significant number of cases become diverted
from the courts, the role of our legal institutions in establishing norms,
promoting social goals, and monitoring compliance must be redefined.
Overall, the results regarding mediation are positive and optimistic. It has
reached the stage in which carefully developed research may be able to
predict and suggest appropriate norms and procedures for optimal use in
the public and private sector.
III. ARBITRATION
A. Is ARBITRATION SUCCESSFUL?
Public and private use of arbitration is increasing." 2 Accelerated
disposition, simplified procedures, and cost savings are promoted as bene-
fits of this ADR method. Accordingly, evaluations have focused on
accomplishment of these objectives.
159. Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 209. For example, Camplair and Stolberg's study of
76 divorcing couples indicated that the settlement was a function of the content of the dispute and
the importance to the individual. Id. Custody disputes were resolved more often than visitation or
child support disputes, but the rate for custody disputes was lower when either the father or mother
considered it the primary dispute. Id. When both the mother and the father rated it as the primary
problem, success in reaching a settlement dropped to 33%. Id. The authors suggest that when
custody is of secondary importance, it may be used for bargaining. Id. at 209-10. Economic issues
were more easily resolved when one party was strongly motivated and the other presented a
noneconomic issue. Camplair & Stolberg, supra note 39, at 210. Resolving economic issues in
mediation is especially difficult when they are important to both parties. Id. The authors concluded
that the content of the dispute and its relative importance are variables to be considered. Id. at 211.
160. Id. at 211. The selection of litigation to resolve less troubling issues is contrary to the belief
that fewer and easier disputes are more suitable for mediation. See Emery & wyer, supra note 33, at
476.
161. Id. at 472. The growth of no fault divorce has resulted in partially removing divorce from
public decision-maldng and has made standards more ambiguous as they are left to the discretion of
the individual couples. Id. at 473 (citing R.H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial
Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBS. 226-92 (1975)).
162. See Kaufman, supra note 1, at 58-59 (reflecting increasing use).
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1. Disposition
Because all court-mandated arbitration programs permit trial de
novo, one issue is whether arbitration actually alleviates court dockets and
promotes quicker resolution of cases. An arbitration program initially
instituted as a component of tort reform in Hawaii provides a partial
answer.'6 The program was analyzed using a randomized experimental
design, in which half of the tort cases were assigned to arbitration and half
to litigation.' The data reviewed included case records, surveys of arbi-
trators and lawyers, and personal interviews." e Since 1986, over 2,000
cases entered the program and the majority of these cases settled. 1"
With only five cases actually going to trial, the arbitration program was
considered effective at reducing Hawaii's court dockets.167
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) evaluated ten federal district
courts with mandatory, court-annexed arbitration programs.'6 The study
considered cost reduction, pace of litigation, provision of additional
options for litigants, and reduction of the federal caseload. 16 9 The FJC
generated the data by interviewing court personnel, tracking cases, and
surveying participants. 170  In terms of case disposition, the majority of
cases closed prior to the arbitration hearing and two-thirds terminated
before being scheduled on the trial calendar. 71 Requests for trial de
novo ranged from 7% to 32% of the arbitration caseload, a number char-
acterized as low.' 72  Less than half of the arbitrated awards were
accepted, yet litigants stated that the experience was useful as a starting
point for negotiations.17 3
In some instances, submission to arbitration is required as a prereq-
uisite for access to the court. For example, the Maryland Health Claims
Arbitration Act requires that all malpractice claims in excess of $5,000 be
163. Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 5, at 134-35. The program includes all tort cases filed
with exemptions permitted for damages exceeding $150,000. Id. at 134.
164. Id. at 135.
165. Id. The evaluation considered cost, pace, and satisfaction. Id.
166. Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 5, at 135. Cases are three times more likely to settle than
to complete the arbitration process. Id. at 135-36. Half of the cases that do proceed through
arbitration are appealed, but most of these also eventually settle. Id. at 136.
167. Id.
168. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 15. In contrast to traditional arbitration, the court-annexed
programs are compulsory and not binding. Id. at 29. Local rules determine program eligibility. Id.
Types of cases heard and potential awards vary between jurisdictions. Id. Following a hearing, a
decision and award are determined. Id. The parties may then file for trial de novo. Id. The courts,
in all except one jurisdiction, discourage new trials by re uiring litigants to pay an amount equal to
the arbitrators' fees if they do not receive a more favorab Udgment at the trial de novo. Id. at 39.
169. Id. at 18. The emphasis on goals varied among the districts. Id.
170. Id. at 21-23. The Center analyzed survey responses from 3,501 attorneys, 62 judges, and
723 participants. Id. at 2.
171. Id. at 48.
172. Id.
173. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 62. The litigants ultimately have the authority to decide
whether a trial de novo will be held, which presumably increases feelings of control. Id.
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submitted to arbitration preceding any litigation.' 74 In a study of 3,277
claims filed, 32% were dismissed, 13% were resolved before the prehear-
ing conference, 27% settled before the formal arbitration hearing, and
25% completed a formal arbitration hearing.'7 5 Of 381 cases that filed for
trial, only eighty-four continued to a trial verdict. 7 6 Thus, a very high
proportion were effectively resolved by the arbitration panels.' 7 7 Twenty-
six states have similar nonbinding arbitration or pretrial screening for
medical malpractice claims. 178 Four states passed such legislation,
repealed it, and reenacted it when claims subsequently increased. 179
State agencies have reported that arbitration is successful in dispos-
ing of cases effectively. The Washington State Attorney General's Office
Consumer Protection Restitution Program provides for arbitration and
negotiation of restitution as alternatives to either litigation or settle-
ment.18 ° In one example, concerning a dispute with a health club, 1,703
claims were received.' 8 ' Of these, 60% settled and 15% were submitted
to arbitration.' 82 The total time for resolution of the complaints was sev-
enteen months.' s3 The program was effective in providing a quick
response, consolidating complaints for economical investigation, and
achieving results."
174. Bureau of National Affairs, Health Care Arbitration System in Maryland Still Evokes
Controversy, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES 122, 122
(Martha A. Matthews ed., 1991) [hereinafter Health Care]. The arbitration conducted by the Health
Claims Arbitration Office is nonbinding and assists with pretrial screening. Id. Between 1976 and
1987, 4000 malpractice claims were filed with 1600 heard by arbitration panels. Id. Between 10%
and 15% of these claims were actually tried before the circuit courts on appeal. Id.
175. Id. at 125. Forty percent of all claims that progressed to a formal arbitration hearing were
found in favor of the claimant. Id. Awards ranged from $300 to $5.4 million. Id. Notice of intent to
appeal was filed for 19% of all closed claims. Id.
176. Id. Uability verdicts were the same as the arbitration panels' determinations in 60 of the
cases and were reversed in 24. Id.
177. Id. at 123. Ninety-five percent of the malpractice cases closed within 15 months of the
initial report which is claimed to be an expedited disposition rate. Id. at 123-24.
178. Id. at 125.
179. Health Care, supra note 174, at 125.
180. Michael S. Gillie, Consumer Protection Restitution Programs Offer Benefits of ADR to
Consumers, Businesses, and State, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTiCE AND
PERSPECTIVES 115, 116 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990). When complaints about a business reach a
certain level, the Attorney General's Office initiates an investigation. Id. at 115. If consumers can
prove they were treated unfairly, damages or modification of the contract are available. Id. at 116.
The business pays administrative costs. Id.
181. Id. at 118.
182. Id. After screening, 12% of the claims were withdrawn. Id. Arbitration resulted in awards
for the consumer 74% of the time and awards for the health club 26% of the time. Id. The total
restitution was $355,307, and 1,130 memberships were cancelled. Id.
183. Id.
184. Although the examples reported were consumer protection cases, the process is considered
adaptable to many types of disputes, such as personal injury or civil rights. Id.
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2. Saving Resources
Arbitration is claimed to provide time and cost savings.'85 Time sav-
ings are generated by enforcing requirements that the arbitration pro-
gress within a proscribed plan. 8 6 The plan generally includes such
features as automatic scheduling of the prehearing conference upon com-
pletion of certain events, limited discovery, and restricting the time
allowed for demanding trial de novo, which not only saves time, but pro-
duces corresponding savings in cost.'87
Feedback from arbitration programs indicates that time and cost sav-
ings are not as positive as might be expected. For example, attorneys
participating in Fulton County, Georgia's state court-annexed arbitration
program reported modestly improved disposition times.' The median
disposition time was 399 days for cases filed before arbitration began and
324 after mediation began.18 9 Arbitration did not have much of an effect
on attorneys' time."9 However, those attorneys who reported time sav-
ings also experienced cost savings.' 9 '
An attorney who was active in promoting passage of the Maryland
health law thought arbitration would be more satisfactory and cheaper
than jury trials because awards would be determined by a three-member
panel. ' 2 However, the size of damage awards has not decreased, and the
number of claims has increased. 193 The arbitration awards do seem to be
185. Lind et al., supra note 4, at 957.
186. For example, the Hawaiian tort reform program, see supra note 163, requires closure
within nine months from service of the complaint. Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 5, at 134.
Following the last answer, an arbitrator is assigned and aprehearing conference is held within 30
days. Id. No discovery is permitted without the consent of the arbitrator. Id. Awards are filed within
seven days following the hearing. Id. The decision is final if there is no appeal and request for trial
de novo is made within 20 days. Id. at 135.
187. Lawyers reported that the costs of discovery in tort cases were reduced in Hawaii. Barkai
& Kassebaum, supra note 5, at 137. However, with contingency fee arrangements, reduction of
discovery costs will not reduce fees for plaintiffs as it should for defendants. Id. at 139. Also, a
significant percentage thought that restricting discovery may have affected the outcome. Id. at 136.
188. Boersema et al., supra note 1, at 28. Beginning in 1986, the program included all civil
cases requesting less than $25,000 in damages. Id. at 29. It began as a response to crowded criminal
dockets and judges' concerns about civil cases not receiving their share of judical resources. Id.
Judges appreciated that arbitration guaranteed third-party involvement. Id.
189. Roger Hanson and Susan Keilitz, Arbitration and Case Processing Time: Lessons from
Fulton County, 14 JusT. Sys. J. 203, 214 (1991).
190. Boersema et al., supra note 1, at 32.
191. Id. The greatest cost savings resulted from spending less time communicating with clients.
Time saved from responding to motions and discussing settlements also reduced costs. Id.
192. See supra note 174 (describing the Maryland health care program).
193. The insurance company created by the legislature to insure physicians distributed one-third
more in claims after arbitration was instituted compared to the number of pre-arbitration claims paid.
Health Care, supra note 174, at 122. Other reforms have attempted to address these concerns. Id. at
123. Plaintiffs and defendants must each file certificates of merit within a specified time following
the initial filing. Id. A limit of $350,000 for noneconomic damages has been established. Id. These
rules have significantly reduced the number of claims. Id.
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reasonable; however, they often match the verdicts attained by parties
exercising the right to a jury determination.'9
The FJC study of arbitration in federal courts concluded that arbitra-
tion has the potential for reducing time, but is not always successful at
doing so.' 9 5 Attorneys agreed that referring a case to the arbitration pro-
gram resulted in earlier settlement discussions but also agreed that cases
did not settle more quickly than had been expected at their initiation.1'
Seventy percent of the litigants in the FJC study considered the time
required for arbitration to be reasonable.' Cases that were resolved by
arbitration ended two to eighteen months sooner than those concluded by
trial.' Attorneys reported favorably on time and cost savings.' 99 How-
ever, those savings vanished if a trial de novo was held."°
3. Fairness and/or Satisfaction
Tort litigants whose cases had been resolved by trial, court-annexed
arbitration, settlement conference, or bilateral settlement were inter-
viewed to determine their impressions of the fairness of the procedures
and their satisfaction with the decisions.2 0 ' Research had suggested that
fairness and satisfaction may be different, although it is frequently
assumed that they are related.202 The study also addressed whether satis-
faction and perceived fairness are linked to cost and delay.203
Both trial and arbitration were considered fairer than bilateral settle-
ment.2° Impressions of fairness did not differ depending upon gender,
race, income, or employment status.20 5  No significant relationship
between fairness and objective measures of case outcome, cost, or length
194. Health Care, supra note 174, at 125.
195. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 109.
196. Id. at 103, 104. Large variations between districts were reported. Id. at 103.
197. Id. at 110. Approximately two-thirds of the parties and attorneys requesting trial de novo
indicated that arbitration was not a waste of time. Id. at 60-61. However, attorneys in de novo cases
did believe that arbitration delayed settlement. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 110. The rejection
of many awards suggests that not all parties were satisfied with the arbitration. Id. at 62.
198. Id. at 59-60.
199. Id. at 93. Sixty percent of the attorneys reported time savings, 62% reported cost savings,
and 65% thought clients had saved time. Id. at 85.
200. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 89. Even with a trial de novo, costs are still considered
reasonable. Id. at 93. Parties are likely to spend more in arbitration than settlement, but less than if a
trial were pursued. Id. Parties report that arbitration was reasonable in terms of cost and time
expended. Id. at 89-90.
201. Lind et al., supra note 4, at 954. Litigants were located in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Maryland. Id. at 961-62.
202. Id. at 955. It is also assumed that outcome is one of most important determinants of
satisfaction. Id. See John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REv. 541,
541-66 (1978) (theorizing that the type of procedure selected affects the relative attainment of justice
or truth).
203. Lind et al., supra note 4, at 967. If the two are not linked, savings, but not fairness and
satisfaction, may be augmented. Id. at 957.
204. Id. at 965.
205. Id. at 973.
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was reported. °6 Whether the outcome matched expectations rather than
the objective outcome seemed to be the most significant determinant of
fairness. °7 Although not as important as obtaining the expected out-
come, impressions of the process, especially having positive feelings of
control, dignity, and comfort, were strongly correlated with perceived
fairness. 208
The importance of being treated with respect and dignity was
reflected in clients' assessments of alternative procedures. Trials were
considered fairer than bilateral settlement, perhaps because litigants were
pleased that their problem received time and attention from the court.2°9
Arbitration, which has relatively more formality than bilateral settlement,
was also perceived as fairer than bilateral settlement. 2 0 Thus, the cere-
mony and ritual that accompanies trials, and to a lesser degree, arbitra-
tion, may enhance a sense of dignity and worth for the participants.21
Litigants participating in mandatory arbitration in the federal courts
did not believe that they received second class justice.212 Eighty-four per-
cent approved of the arbitration concept and programs as instituted.213
Eighty percent of the parties rated the procedure as fair, even those who
were dissatisfied with the result.214 A sense of fairness was enhanced
when litigants understood the procedure, experienced control, and con-
sidered the time reasonable. 21 5  Ninety-two percent of the attorneys
206. Lind et al., supra note 4, at 968. A slightly stronger relationship was established with
subjective measures of outcome, cost, and time, but these were still not good predictors of perceived
fairness. Id. at 971.
207. Id. Similar results were reported in a study of arbitration of malpractice claims. Despite
the fact that doctors are found liable in cases using an arbitration panel more often than with the jury
system and that the size of awards has not been reduced in arbitration, some doctors and malpractice
insurers contend that arbitration is a method for reducing the number of cases. Health Care, supra
note 174, at 122, 124.
208. Lind et al., supra note 4, at 973. Personal characteristics, including age, gender, race,
income, employment status, and marital status, had little effect on perceptions of procedural fairness.
Id.
209. Id. at 981. Opinions of trials were more favorable than expected. Id.
210. Id. at 982. Formality was apparently associated with the arbitration process but was found
lacking during negotiations. Id. It appears possible to provide adequate dignity with less than a full
trial. Id.
211. The author warns against overgeneralizing the less favorable reactions to adjudication
beyond this particular tort sample and notes that more favorable reactions to settlement procedures
have been noted in small claims and criminal court settings. Id. at 983. See Jonathan D. Casper,
Having Their Day in Court: Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12 LAw &
Soc'y REV. 237, 249 (1978) (reporting that a sense of equity is related to fair treatment for criminal
defendants); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAw AND Soc'y REV. 11, 41 (1984) (emphasizing the importance of
obtaining consent to achieve positive results in small claims compliance).
212. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 82.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 63. The range was 76% to 98% of the parties. Id.
215. Id. at 65. Eighty-one percent considered the actual hearing to be fair. Id. Satisfied parties
were more likely to consider it fair. Id. Significantly lower fairness ratings were reported when the
participants did not understand what was occuring, when the arbitrators were unprepared, or when
the opportunity to explain and discuss claims was inhibited. Id. at 67.
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involved with arbitrations regarded the hearings as fair; fair being defined
as having sufficient formality, adequate time, well-prepared arbitrators,
and time and cost savings.216 In considering cost, time, and fairness, half
of the litigants and a plurality of the attorneys in arbitration preferred
arbitration over a judge or jury trial.217
B. ATTITUDES OF THE BENCH AND BAR
1. Attorneys
Opinions about a state court-annexed arbitration program were solic-
ited from 136 attorneys in Georgia.218 The consensus was that the pro-
cess is fair and outcomes are satisfactory.219 Two-thirds of the attorneys
thought that panel members possessed the necessary skills for conducting
the arbitration hearing and that the hearing was impartial. 220 The process
was rated more favorably than the results.22' Satisfaction with the deci-
sions corresponded to the attorneys' views of its fairness .1 2 The third-
party review was valued by two-thirds of the attorneys, and a majority
thought that the arbitration process initiated serious negotiations. 2 3 The
favorable results regarding arbitration replicated the results of a similar
survey of 600 attorneys in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 224
Lawyers may be more satisfied with litigation than arbitration.22'
Although a majority of the lawyers participating in a mandatory state
216. Id. at 67, 82. Formality was an important characteristic for attorneys but not for parties in
this study. Id. at 67-68. This contrasts with Lind's findings, supra note 5, and with an independent
privately funded evaluation of the federal pilot program in North Carolina. Id. at 68 n.55 (citing E.
LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A
UNITED STATES DisTRICT COURT 15-22 (Rand Corp. 1990) (reporting that private parties like less
formal proceedings than those preferred by commercial parties)).
217. Id. at 82. Arbitration was preferred by all attorneys when it saved time. Id. Plaintiffs'
attorneys rated arbitration more favorably than did defendants' attorneys. Id. at 79. The higher the
fees being paid to the arbitrators, the lower the attorneys' approval ratings. Id. at 83.
218. Boersema et al., supra note 1, at 30. For a description of the Georgia program, see supra
note 190. The civil cases were predominantly automobile torts followed by other torts, contracts,
collections, and administrative matters. Id. at 29. Cases were referred to panels of three attorneys
after the deadline for discovery had passed. Id.
219. Id. at 30. Rules andprocedures were considered fair by 92% of the attorneys. Id. at 30,
T.2.
220. Id. at 31. Ninety percent reported that the arbitrators showed no favoritism. Id. at 30, T.3.
221. Id. at 31. Twenty percent thought the results were unfair and another 20% reported some
degree of unfairness. Id.
222. Id. at 32. The two were significantly related: The greater the satisfaction with the award,
the higher the rating of fairness. Id. at 32 n.16. Both the fairness of the process and the ability of the
arbitration to advance negotiations and settlement were independently related to satisfaction. Id. at
33.
223. Boersema et al., supra note 1, at 31. However, only 41% think that arbitration is able to
contain monetary awards within limits. Id.
224. Raymond J. Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration Providing Litigants with a
Speedier and Less Expensive Alternative to the Traditional Courtroom Trial, 75 JUDICATURE 41, 41
(1991). A survey of 600 attorneys indicated that 93% approved or strongly approved of the program.
Id. at 43. Attorneys reported both time and cost savings. Id. For cases similar to the type referred to
arbitration, 61% preferred arbitration to a judge or jury. Id.
225. Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 5, at 142.
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court-annexed program reported being satisfied, the imposed awards
were considered less satisfactory than voluntary settlements.226 In addi-
tion to the awards being less than satisfactory, arbitration was perceived as
an unnecessary burden when it was an additional step to litigation. 27
2. Judicial Input
Judges are generally positive about the use of state court-annexed
arbitration.228 When it was initiated in Eastern Pennsylvania fourteen
years ago, some judges were opposed to arbitration, but a survey pub-
lished recently indicated unanimous support.229 The judges are con-
vinced that arbitration provides speedier resolution of all litigation.230
The median time from the date of the answer until arbitration is five
months instead of twelve, which is the median time required to reach
trial.2 31 Shorter time results in savings in attorney fees, discovery, and
related costs.1 2  Judges report that settlements tend to be accepted by
the parties and that a large percentage of litigants are satisfied. Limited
reports indicate that the process is viewed as fair.'
Success in state court programs has not been uniformly achieved or
acknowledged, however.234 In state court programs, arbitrated settle-
226. Id. at 141. Defense lawyers are more satisfied with regular litigation settlements. Id. at
142. There is a loss of revenue with arbitration, possibly due to working fewer hours on each case.
Id. However, settlements from arbitration or litigation are equally satistying to plaintiffs' attorneys.
Id. Plaintiffs' attorneys in the federal programs were also more pleased with the arbitration than
defense counsel. METERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 79.
227. Health Care, supra note 174, at 122-123. The attorneys' concern is that arbitration only
delays the inevitable litigation. Id. at 122. Speaking about medical malpractice arbitration, one
lawyer concluded: "It just hasn't turned out to be a good idea, although organized medicine is still
willing to give it a try." Id. at 123.
228. Edwards, supra note 56, at 674. But see Honorable Bruce M. Van Sickle, Open Letter, 70
N.D. L. REV. - (1994) (suggesting that a jury's consideration of emotional factors is more valuable
for society than any mandatory ADR); Judge Rodney S. Webb, Court-Annexed "ADR"-A Dissent, 70
N.D. L. REV. - (1994) (proposing that ADR is an unsatisfactory and possibly unconstitutional
alternative to jury trials).
229. Broderick, supra note 224, at 41.
230. Id. The arbitration rule is named the "Speedy Civil Trial." Id. at 42 (describing the
procedure). "It is not a 'mini-trial;' it is not a 'summary jury trial;' it is not a 'settlement conference.'
It is a civil trial." Id. at 43. In Eastern Pennsylvania, statistical summaries are prepared each month.
Id. Over the past 160 months, 21,922 cases entered arbitration and 96% were terminated: 44% by
settlement, 36% by motion, and only 2% by demand for trial de novo. Id. at 43-44.
231. Id. at 44.
232. Id. For example, in Pittsburgh, court-annexed arbitration ends three-quarters of all cases
without a court appearance. Edwards, supra note 56, at 674 (citing INSTrrUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN
OVERVIEW OF THE FIRST FIVE PROCRAM YEARS 36 (1983)). It is also quicker. The median time to an
arbitration hearing is three months compared to 18 months' wait for trial. Id. In Michigan, although
the arbitration award is accepted in less than half of the cases, only 7% continue to trial. Id. (citing
Kathy L. Shuart et al., Settling Cases in Detroit: An Examination of Wayne County's "Mediation"
Program, 8 JusT. Sys. J. 307, 315 (1983)). The Michigan program reported that the program itself
was more effective in eliminating demands for trial de novo than the penalty assessment. Shuart,
supra, at 323.
233. Edwards, supra note 56, at 674 (citing INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN OVERVIEW OF
THE FIRST FIVE PROCRAM YEARS 36 (1983)).
234. Id.
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ments must be nonbinding unless the parties agree otherwise. If trial de
novo remains available following disappointing results, parties are likely to
choose that option.' Thus, arbitration may be effective only if litigants
are willing to waive their jury rights.2 6 Although the ultimate potential of
arbitration has not been attained, even critics acknowledge that the par-
ties obtain a neutral assessment of their case and often settle earlier.2 ga
In one study, federal judges rated mandatory arbitration programs
after participating for eighteen months.23' They supported their own pro-
grams, with support directly related to the degree that arbitration reduced
caseloads.23 9 Judges indicated that their work was reduced depending
upon the number of cases diverted to arbitration, the extent of judicial
involvement in the prehearing arbitration, and the number of cases
returning for trial.2 °
The United States Supreme Court has indicated support for arbitra-
tion by refusing to legitimize speculation that arbitration cannot furnish
adequate dispute resolution.24 1 Justice White reiterated the Court's posi-
tion that generalized attacks on arbitration " 'res[t] on suspicion of arbitra-
tion as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive
law to would-be complainants,' and as such, they are 'far out of step with
our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes.' ,,242
235. Id. Judge Edwards notes that over half of the arbitrated health claims in the Maryland
system are refused in favor of a trial de novo. Id. (citing James K. MacAlister & Alfred L. Scanlan, Jr.,
Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland: The Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REV. 481, 501
(1985)).
236. Id. at 674.
237. Id. at 675.
238. MESERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 111.
239. Id. at 118. Ninety-seven percent said caseloads were reduced. Id.
240. Id. at 115. Certain characteristics are indicative of a greater likelihood of requiring trial,
i.e., a contract case in a program that specifies a longer answer-to-hearing time, and a panel paid
lower fees. Id. at 118. An attempt to expand the federal arbitration program to encompass all federal
courts failed in Congress after being opposed by some of the federal judiciary. Henry Reske, Bill to
Expand Arbitration Defeated, 80 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 22. The pilot program was continued until
December 31, 1994. Id.
241. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). Robert Gilmer,terminated at age 62, brought suit against Interstate/Johnson in the United States District Court
under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). Id. at 1651. Gilmer
challenged the use of arbitration maintaining that a judicial forum was necessary to protect his rights.
Id. at 1653. Respondent sought to compel arbitration based upon an agreement in Gilmer'sregistraion as a ecurities representative and the Federal Arbitrati  Act. id. at 1650-51. The
District Court denied the motion, reasoning, in part, that Congress had not intended to foreclose ajudicial forum to ADEA claimants. Id. at 1651. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,holding that Congress had not intended topreclude enforcement of arbitration agreements. id. For
a more detailed analysis of Gilmer, see Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the "Alternative" Out of theDispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: The Impliations of a Mandatory Enforcement Scheme of
Arbitration Agreements Arising Out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D.iL. REV. - (1994).
242. Id. at 1654 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989)).
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The Court noted that arbitration rules provide adequate safeguards
against biases. 43 The limited discovery in arbitration is not insuffi-
cient. 24 In affirming a Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding an
arbitration agreement in an age discrimination action, the Court noted:
"[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunal inhibited the devel-
opment of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. 2 4
C. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
1. Measurement Problems
Much of the evaluation of arbitration has focused on speed, cost, and
efficiency. Results have been generally positive with respect to these lim-
ited variables. To accurately assess arbitration, comparisons with actual
trial situations are necessary. However, adequate comparisons are diffi-
cult to make. The number of cases settled through arbitration is not an
accurate measure of success because most cases would eventually settle
even if they were not in arbitration. Moreover, there is no direct parallel
to arbitration awards in litigation.246 Arbitration awards are not actually
settlements because they are nonbinding, follow a hearing, and involve a
third-party neutral. Furthermore, no court trial or option for appellate
review is provided for arbitration awards." 7
Client perceptions are addressed less frequently in arbitration criti-
ques than in mediation reviews. However, there is some indication that
concern for litigants' intimidation by formal court procedures is
unfounded.2 48  Reducing cost and delay may fail to improve subjective
evaluations of outcomes, costs, or delays.249 In fact, innovations that are
created to increase settlement rates may diminish understanding, partici-
pation, and perceived fairness.250
243. Id. For example, the applicable arbitration rules require disclosure of employment
histories, allow one peremptory challenge, allow unlimited challenges for cause, and provide that
results may be overturned upon evidence of bias. Id.
244. Id. The Court considered that the relaxation of the rules of evidence was counterbalanced
by allowing limited discovery. Id. at 1655.
245. Id. at 1656 n.5 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626-27 (1985)).
246. Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 5, at 146. It is inaccurate to compare costs and benefits of
arbitration to litigation. Id. Receiving an award through arbitration is more expensive than receiving
an award through settlement, and most cases would eventually settle without arbitration. Id.
247. Id. The most appropriate comparison may be to pleadings, motions, and settlement
conferences. Id.
248. Und et al., supra note 4, at 981. Assumptions made by ADR advocates that the formality
of trials has a negative effect on clients are disputed. Id. at 982.
249. Id. at 957.
250. Id. at 982. See also Howard Erlanger et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal
Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW AND Soc'v REV. 585, 596-97 (1987)
(suggesting that discretion may be undesirable because nonlegal considerations, intimidation, and
financial leverage may influence the results).
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Social theories regarding the purpose of arbitration suggest different
models for evaluation. For example, exchange theorists suggest that out-
comes are evaluated according to personal standards or expectations.2 5 1
The closer the result approximates expectations, the greater the party's
satisfaction. 2 A different hypothesis is proposed by procedural justice
theorists, who suggest that sensitivity to the process is most crucial.25
The questions asked by researchers will vary depending upon the
model that is most attractive and plausible to them. Knowing the hypoth-
eses that generated certain studies would help to interpret the results.'
2. Discussion and Suggestions
Satisfaction with arbitration is not unanimous, and some data indi-
cates that lawyers, especially defense lawyers, consider litigation to be
preferable." Clients have criticized lawyers' lack of effort in promoting
arbitration. As one physician involved in the arbitration of medical claims
noted: lawyers do not conform to established standards of behavior.
"'We have a medical malpractice industry out there consisting of lawyers
and liability insurance companies and they dislike the arbitration system
because it is an interim step they would prefer not to go through. Law-
yers love juries, and so long as the country appears to be run by lawyers,
nothing will change.' ,256 The attitudes and practices of lawyers will con-
tinue to affect the public's perception and acceptance of arbitration."57
Is arbitration successful? The studies to date, while providing pre-
liminary data and suggestions, elicit an even greater number of
unresolved issues: What type of lawsuit, jurisdiction, or amount in con-
troversy is best suited to arbitration?258 Should a required percentage of
251. Uind et al., supra note 4, at 957.
252. Id. at 975.
253. Id. at 957. Perceived control over the case outcome and the process determine whether
the results are considered fair. Id.
254. Attorneys, in addition to researchers, remain an important source of information about
arbitration, also. Id. at 959. Lawyers define the divorce situation for their clients and invite
dependence. Austin Sarat & William Felstiner, Law and Social Relations: Vocabularies of Motive in
Lawyer/Client Interaction, 22 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 737, 765 (1988). The situation is not always
depicted in an impartial manner; lawyers explain their deficiencies in terms of being limited by other
lawyers and judges. Id. at 763 n.12. Thus, clients may not have accurate information for their
decision-making.
255. See supra note 216.
256. Health Care, supra note 174, at 124.
257. Ide, supra note 1, at 8. R. William Ide III, President of the American Bar Association,
commented that emphasizing the use of ADR will contribute to improving the public's perception of
lawyers. Id.
258. The Federal Judicial Center research did not identify any type of suit, jurisdiction, or
amount better suited to arbitration than to litigation. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 123. Some
evidence indicates that tort and civil rights cases might benefit from having increased options. Id.
There is currently no mandatory referral for civil rights cases. Id.
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cases be diverted to arbitration?259 Can the best time for beginning the
arbitration process be predicted?26° What is the optimal time between
the answer and the hearing?261 Are appropriate and consistent screening
and referral procedures instituted?262  How many arbitrators should be
used, and if they are not voluntary, how much should they be paid?
Answers to these questions will have an impact on the results of and reac-
tions to arbitration.2
IV. SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
A. ARE SUMMARY JURY TRIALS SUCCESSFUL?
In the federal court system, the summary jury trial (SJT) is the most
frequently used method of alternative dispute resolution. 26 The SJT,
which may be mandatory or voluntary, is also practiced in state courts. In
a Florida study, greater satisfaction was reported following voluntary par-
ticipation in state SJTs compared to the mandated federal SJT.2  How-
ever, variables such as the amount in controversy or the type of litigation
259. If less than 15% of the cases are diverted to arbitration, the process is less likely to be
considered helpful by judges. Id.
260. Requiring adherence to shorter time guidelines may speed settlement but could also result
in holding a hearing before the parties have enough information. Id. at 127. On the other hand,
earlier intervention may be helpful in preventing suits. Robyn S. Shapiro et al., A Survey of Sued and
Nonsued Physicians and Suing Patients, 149 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2190, 2194 (1989). In a
survey of 642 sued physicians, nonsued physicians, and suing patients, id. at 2190, both sued and
nonsued psysicians reported that a malpractice claim or even the threat of one had a negative effect
on their clinical practice. Id. at 2193. The survey confirmed that significant misunderstandings in the
doctor-patient relationship exist just prior to filing a lawsuit. Id. at 2194. The number of litigated
claims could be reduced by nonjudicial informal dispute resolution mechanisms made available at
that time. Id.
261. A shorter time period is significantly associated with quicker settlements, as well as with
fewer attorneys' selecting arbitration and with increasing probabilities that the case would continue to
trial de novo. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 127.
262. Arbitration may be unsuitable in some instances. Some disputes require that legal
precedent be determined or upheld. Practical considerations may foreclose the optimal use of
arbitration. For example, when the preponderance of evidence supports one side or when one party
would prefer settlement, arbitration is not likely to be an attractive option. Ryan Ver Berkmoes, More
Talk, Less Squawk!, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 13, 1993, at 31, 32.
263. See MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 127-29 (discussing the relationship between the
number of arbitrators versus the cost and administrative burden). The negative appearance of only
one arbitrator must be balanced against the expense of panels. Id. at 128. Attorneys are less likely to
select arbitration when only one arbitrator is to decide the case; the number of arbitrators did not
affect whether parties chose arbitration. Id. The issue of who is qualified to sit on various panels is
an issue. For health care decisions, some think it is ridiculous to have persons other than physicians
on the panels; others think the basic intelligence of lay persons is sufficient. Health Care, supra note
174, at 124.
264. Katz, supra note 7, at 13. In the summary jury trial, a sample jury, selected from the
regular jury panel, hears a shortened presentation under altered procedural rules, and determines a
nonbinding verdict. Thomas J. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 474-76.
265. James J. Alfini, Summary Jury Trial in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis
of the Perceptions of Particular Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 213, 222 (1989). Two case
studies summarized interviews of participants and mail surveys of attorneys who had participated in
SJTs. Id. at 214.
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may complicate direct comparisons. 2  Suggesting that the settlement
award may be an appropriate measure of fairness, the Florida survey
reported that 64% of the state lawyers considered it an accurate approxi-
mation of a jury verdict.2 6 SJT verdicts were considered a good estimate
of potential jury verdicts in 53% of the federal cases. 68
The amount of the award in the SJT was the single most influential
factor in producing a settlement.26 9 After receiving a neutral estimate of
the value of the case, parties may be more willing to alter their expecta-
tions and consider compromising.270 The SJT's guidelines for scheduling
and completion of tasks were also considered valuable aids to settle-
ment.271 Although participants are generally satisfied with the SJT, they
report experiencing pressure to settle-even when they think the verdict
is inaccurate and the result of inadequate procedures. 2
Encouraging settlements may arise from the court's desire to
increase efficiency.2 3 Even so, SJTs may not be more efficient than
traditional trials. In both state and federal courts in Florida, cases with
intermediate SJT's fail to settle and thus proceed to trial at the same rate
as cases without intermediate SJTs. 274 Setting limits on the amount in
controversy for SJTs is an attempt to promote efficiency, but the practice
is criticized as too controlling. When the award to be decided is small,
trial de novo is not worth the added expense; if the potential award is
higher and there is a lot at stake, trials are encouraged. 5
Following a three-day SJT in federal district court, jurors were asked
to complete an exit poll.2 76 All ten jurors found it acceptable that they
were led to believe that they were participating in an actual trial. Nine
jurors indicated that they would not have decided differently if they had
266. For example, the length of the cases, complexity, and number of parties varied greatly
between state and federal SJTs. Id. at 229.
267. Katz, supra note 7, at 49.
268. Id The award was rated too low by 28% of the federal lawyers and too high by 19%. Id.
269. Id at 224.
270. Katz, supra note 7, at 49.
271. Id. at 222. Litigants may hesitate to compromise on a settlement amount before receiving
the SJT verdict. Katz, supra note 7, at 49.
272. Charles F. Webber, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1495, 1517 (1989). Parties maybe pressured to settle by their attorneys and by practical
considerations, such as incurring additional time and cost. Id. at 1517-18.
273. See Eisele, supra note 8, at 36. Coerced settlement is the primary objective of compulsory
ADR. Id.
274. Alfini, supra note 265, at 222-23. Nine percent of the state SJTs and 14% of the federal
SJTs were followed by requests for an actual trial. Id.
275. Eisele, supra note 8, at 36. Judge Raymond Broderick of the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania concedes that the required amount in controversy is selected to make a trial de novo
economically unfeasible, because neither the court nor participants save money when the losing party
is encouraged to demand a trial. Id.
276. Richard A. Enslen, Federal Judge Says Summary Jury Trials Can Help Settlement in Toxic
Tort Cases, in ALTERNATIVE DisPuTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES (Martha A.
Matthews ed., 1990), supra note 62, at 104, 105 (adapted from memorandum).
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known their decision was not binding.277 Nine thought their time on
summary jury duty was well-spent. 7  Although one exit poll is a very
limited sample, the jurors opinions were uniformly positive.
B. OPINIONS OF THE BENCH AND BAR
1. Judicial Input
Judges express divergent opinions about SJTs. Many are convinced
that SJTs result in settlement and save time even when attorneys do not
want to participate. 9 Judge Thomas J. Lambros, who instituted the pro-
cedure in the Northern District of Ohio, considers the SJT a success.
Judge Lambros sampled 49 SJTs. 28' Ninety-two percent of his sample
settled after the SJT.28' Substantial cost savings were also reported.28 2
It is difficult to compare SJT results to what would have happened
without the procedure, but the cases selected for SJT do not appear to be
selected with any bias toward their potential success in reaching settle-
ment. Thus, the SJT does appear to have an impact on settlement.
Other judicial opinions cite the participation of parties and the pre-
view of eventual success or failure in court as factors contributing to the
success of SJTs. 2s Cases that are optimal for the SJT are those in which
1) attorneys for both parties are similarly competent, 2) a genuine dispute
about the monetary value of the case exists, and 3) court appearance
might benefit the parties psychologically. " 4
277. Id. at 106. Six of the 10 jurors did not experience difficulty understanding the lawyers; half
were not hindered by the absense of cross-examination; half thought a video presentation helped;
seven of the 10 thought too much information was presented; all were convinced they could
remember and understand the directions; and nine considered the summary jury trial a worthwhile
use of their time. Id.
278. Id.
279. Katz, supra note 7, at 21. See, e.g., McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44-49 (E.D.
Ky. 1988):
In my own experience summary jury trials have netted me a savings in time of about
60 days and I have only used the procedure five times. It settled two of these cases that
were set for 30-day trials. It is true that I cannot prove scientifically that the cases would
not have settled anyway but my experience tells me they would not. I do know that but
for making summary jury trials mandatory in these cases, they would not have occurred.
Id. at 49. Similar opinions express confidence that SJTs can foster settlement for parties seemingly
determined to litigate. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604
(D. Minn. 1988) (describing the benefits of the SJT in promoting settlement).
280. Lambros, supra note 264, at 473.
281. Id. Eighty-eight cases had originally been scheduled for SJT, and 44% settled before that
time. Id. at 472-73.
282. Id. at 473-74. The savings derived from the 49 SJTs was $73,702, approximately $1,504.12
each. Id. at 473.
283. Katz, supra note 7, at 21-22 (citing McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 50). Parties do not settle when
they are unable to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their case accurately and when they feel
deprived of the right to present their case in court. Id. But see Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois
838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987) (refusing to equate the SJT with settlement conferences and
characterixing its use to compel negotiations as improper).
284. Clord J. Zatz, Toxic Tort Case Unlikely to Have Settled Without Summary Jury Trial,
Lawyer Says, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERsPECTIwES 107, 108
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Other judges who have used the SJT are less favorably impressed.
Judge Richard A. Posner of Northern Ohio is a dissatisfied user of the
SJT. In an informal study he estimated that disposition times were
greater and termination rates were lower following institution of the
SJT.' Because SJTs have not been efficient, Judge Posner instead rec-
ommends limiting access to the courts.286 His opinion implies that using
jurors for SJTs may not be lawful and may have a negative impact on the
jury system. 7
Judge G. Thomas Eisele of the Eastern District of Arkansas also vig-
orously opposes court-annexed mandatory ADR programs in federal
courts.288 His concern is that the rules and procedures which have
evolved to protect due process will be perceived as unimportant in
ADR.28 9 Voluntary programs which are designed to complement the cur-
rent system would be preferable. 290 Even the term SJT evokes his heated
response:
Do truth in advertising laws not apply to federal courts? Is
there any trial judge or trial attorney out there who really
believes that what happens at one of these ADR proceedings is
a trial? .... "Justice"-not compromise, not efficiency, not cost
effectiveness, but justice. There ought to be a place where
that-and that alone-controls and defines the parameters of
permissible procedures ....
2. Attorneys
Attorneys in federal SJTs were concerned that the summary juries
did not weigh the evidence properly, but were swayed by the oral argu-
(Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990) (discussing comments made by Judge Richard Enslen). Judge
Enslen, after presiding over an SJT groundwater contamination case, was convinced that resources
were saved. Enslen, sura note 276, at 105. In a three-day summary Jury trial in federal district
court, a $3,500,000 setement was negotiated following a SJT. Id. If the case had proceeded to
actual trial, additional costs were estimated to be approximately $3,000,000 for the defendants, and
$500,000 for plaintiffs' discovery. Id. at 106. The defendants had over 60 experts as potential
witnesses, and the plaintiffs had over 20 experts who would have testified if the SJT had not resolved
the case. Id. Thus, the estimated savings greatly outweighed the cost of the procedure.
285. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHil. L. REV. 366, 378-81 (1986).
286. Id. at 389.
287. Id. at 386. Courts have refused to compel members of the jury pool to serve as a summary
jury. See, e.g., Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 509 (N.D. Ohio 1990). Inpart, the
Hume court disapproves of SJTs because evidence and arguments may be manipulated. Id. at 508
n.3.
288. See Eisele, supra note 8, at 36 (arguing that ADR programs are coercive and deny parties
access to the court).
289. Eisele, supra note 8, at 35. Judge Eisele believes that mandatory ADR programs send a
message that ascertaining the truth and vindicating rights are not particularly important. Id.
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ments and personalities of the lawyers. 92 The attorneys indicated that
they experienced a lack of control over the presentations.293 Yet, prepara-
tion was equally as demanding; discovery had to be extensive because
there would be no cross examination. 94 Time limits were oppressive. 95
Strong opposition to the inability to object existed.296 Defendants' attor-
neys contended that plaintiffs were permitted to present whatever argu-
ments they chose at length without the restraint of cross-examination to
check the emotional intensity and to shift the jury's attention. 29 7 Attor-
neys were doubtful about their ability to capture the essence of complex
cases in a SJT.298 Some thought that when the same judge would preside
over the actual trial if one became necessary, an impartial decision was
not possible.299
One perceived advantage of SJTs is that plaintiffs' lawyers are able to
determine whether continued investment in a case is reasonable. Addi-
tionally, even if the case settles, plaintiffs have had an opportunity to pres-
ent their case publicly.3 0°  Attorneys recommended allowing more time
for presentations, adding restrictions to the presentation of evidence,
allowing limited use of objections, and allowing cross-examination of key
witnesses.° 1
C. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The SJT is relatively harder to evaluate than mediation or arbitration
because of the smaller number of cases involved and less formal methods
of collecting information. 3°z Goals of the SJT are to reduce litigation
costs, speed the disposition of claims, and decrease the number of cases
going to trial. Results for participants have been generally satisfactory;
however, attorneys are not as pleased.303 There is no consensus about
whether SJTs are actually efficient in reducing the number of trials or
292. Alfini, supra note 265, at 220. Juries reacted emotionally, forming improper assumptions
about facts for which no evidence had been presented. Zatz, supra note 287, at 110.
293. Zatz, supra note 284, at 110. All of the jurors in a toxic tort case indicated that they were
confused by the experts' presentations on videotape. Id. at 110-11.
294. Id. at 108.
295. Id. at 111.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Zatz, supra note 284, at 111. Not only were jurors confused, but the attorneys believed
that they could not completely explain the complicated scientific and medical principles related to
liability. Id.
299. Id. at 112. However, judges also often form opinions during pretrial procedures. Id.
300. Id. at 107.
301. Id. at 112. The SJT is not perfect. However, as an alternative to a trial, it was considered a
success. Id.
302. Katz, supra note 7, at 48.
303. Id. at 48-49. Attorneys' opinions are important because they are able to assess relative
advantages and disadvantages. Boersema et al., supra note 1, at 28-29. Moreover, attorneys are in a
position to obstruct or promote implementation. Id.
1994]
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whether they are substitutes for settlements that would inevitably
occur.
3 0 4
Are SJTs a success? Questions for the future include: Should some
types of cases should be excluded from SJTs? What is the purpose of the
SJT, e.g., efficiency and docket reduction or qualitative changes in the
judicial system? What procedures might increase effectiveness? What
rules of procedure should be applicable? Should the SJT facilitate
existing court functions or be an alternative option?305
V. THE QUALITY OF ADR
A. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Constitutional challenges to ADR have been based on the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial; the Due Process Clause; the Equal Protec-
tion Clause; Article III judicial powers; the First Amendment; and corre-
sponding rights guaranteed by state constitutions.30 6  Claims based on
constitutional violations, however, have not been particularly
successful. 307
Generally, mandatory ADR does not violate the Seventh Amend-
ment if a jury trial de novo is available at some time. 0" ADR results
which are not binding can be rejected. However, attempting to resolve
the dispute with ADR may be a prerequisite to jury access or be associ-
ated with penalties designed to discourage requests for trial. If these
restrictions unreasonably impair access to a jury trial, constitutional rights
may be violated.30 9 The test for impairment is historical, and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted the Seventh Amendment to
304. Judges have noted that settlements tend to occur as the trial date app roaches. Setting a
firm trial date may accomplish the same purpose as the SJT. See, e.g., E. Donad Elliot, Managerial
Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 313 (1986).
305. Edwards, supra note 56, at 671. ADR may result in the abandonment of legal enforcement
by the government. Id. Perhaps "some forms of ADR should remain mandatory, but not binding."
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 42. However, to compare the two, a sufficient number of both
types is necessary. Id. If mandatory, adequate legal protections must be provided. Id. Stenographic
recordings can provide a record for appeals. Id. Also, as protection for the litigant, ADR should not
be conducted by the person who would preside at trial. Id. at 43.
306. See Katz, supra note 7, at 22-31 (increasing constitutional challenges to ADR occurred in
the mid to late 1970s); see also Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory:
The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REV. 487, 487-564 (1989) (discussing constitutional problems
raised by mandatory, nonbinding ADR).
307. Katz, supra note 7, at 22.
308. Id. at 23. ADR encompasses claims which traditionally allow the right to demand jury trial.
Dwight Golann, Reasonableness Standard Guides Analysis of ADR Burdens on Jury Trial Rights, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES 251, 251 (Martha A. Matthews
ed., 1990). Considerations include whether the process applies to a legal cause of action and the
degree of compulsory participation. Id. The mediation and arbitration processes do not provide for
jury trials, and even SJTs do not satisfy constitutional standards when binding decisions are issued.
Id.
309. Katz, supra note 7, at 51.
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permit innovations in civil procedure.310 In the absence of historical pre-
cedent, a reasonableness standard is considered. 311 The benefits of elimi-
nating frivolous suits and fostering efficiency have met this standard when
weighed against possible burdens on the litigants.312
New procedures may be created and existing procedures may be
altered as long as the essentials of due process are maintained.31 3 How-
ever, the Due Process Clause could be violated if safeguards, such as ade-
quate notice, are not provided.
Permitting only one party the option of selecting ADR and assigning
ADR to restricted classes of lawsuits may violate the Equal Protection
Clause. 314 Nevertheless, such classifications have been upheld when
reviewed under the rational basis standard applied to social and economic
legislation.31 5
Another concern is that vesting decision-making powers in nonjudges
may obscure requirements regarding separation of powers. 316 Yet, ADR
may be characterized as merely a delay rather than a bypass of judicial
review, and thus, not violate Article III.3 " Especially when the results
are only suggestions, courts are reluctant to invalidate assistance from
third-party neutrals.31  There are potential challenges, particularly to the
specific implementation of ADR procedures; however, with few excep-
tions, ADR has been adjudged constitutional.
B. SOCIAL POLICY
1. Public vs. Private Justice
Opinions about ADR range from concerns about depriving a seg-
ment of the population of important legal rights and fears about weaken-
310. Golann, supra note 308, at 251; Katz, supra note 7, at 22.
[T]he Seventh Amendment . . . does not require that old forms of practice and
procedure be retained .... New devices may be used to adapt the ancient institution to
present needs and to make of it an efficient instrument in the administration of justice.
Indeed such changes are essential to the preservation of the right.
In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920).
311. Golann, supra note 308, at 252. Imposition of penalties in response to demand for jury trial
is not a constitutional violation, if the penalties are reasonable. Katz, supra note 7, at 23.
312. Katz, supra note 7, at 23.
313. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (permitting due process requirements to
vary). Due process requirements depend upon a number of factors. Katz, supra note 7, at 24.
314. Katz, supra note 7, at 27. Claims have been upheld in the medical malpractice area.
Applying ADR to specific classifications of suits is justified under the rational basis standard. Katz,
supra note 7, at 26.
315. Katz, supra note 7, at 26-28.
316. Id. at 28. Judicial power is vested in judges appointed by the President. Id. Non-Article
III judges may not decide disputes within the power of Article III courts. Id. (citing U.S. Const. art.
III, cl. 1).
317. Katz, supra note 7, at 29.
318. Id. (citing DiBerardino v. DiBerardino, 568 A.2d 431, 437 (Conn. 1990)). Courts have
invalidated lay assistance when binding decisions have been made. E.g., Bernier v. Burris, 497
N.E.2d 763, 769 (Ill. 1986).
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ing the morality of the law to advocacy of ADR because of efficiency
(speed, cost, access) and enthusiasm for ADR as social progress.319
Critics maintain that the use of ADR to resolve important social
issues or public rights is inappropriate. 320 ADR delays the evolution of
society's standards by removing disputes from the aegis of public deci-
sion-making.32' ADR may end litigation, but the public interest may not
be served because private agreements do not necessarily foster group val-
ues.3 22 Resolving disputes is secondary to using the law to shape public
ideals. To be consistent with this philosophy, the law should interpret and
enforce public values and rules rather than promote private aims. 23
ADR advocates, however, do not agree that the public interest is
ignored when efficiency issues are emphasized. Resolving disputes
through ADR rather than through litigation achieves harmony at a lower
cost.3 24 The goal of making efficient use of finite resources does address
public interest. Even if the result is less "just," there is value to society in
terminating disputes.
2. Costs of Settlement vs. Judgment
ADR is oriented toward settlement, a practice considered optimal
because it has the parties' consent.3 26 Settlement is not the preferred
conclusion to disputes for everyone, however.32 7 The settlement process
may be flawed by inequities: participation may be constrained by con-
tractual relationships or by lack of authority to speak for groups not pres-
ent.328  Effective participation may be hindered by power imbalances
319. E.g., Luban, supra note 2, at 381.
320. E.g., Edwards, supra note 56, at 676; Andrew McThenia & Thomas Schaffer, For
Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664 (1985).
321. Luban, supra note 2, at 388. The judicial system uses public resources and employs
officials empowered by law rather than private agreement. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1085. The work of
judges is impeded when their role is usurped by third-parties. Id.
322. E.g., Edwards, supra note 56, at 678-79. One fear of ADR is that its "objective is to reduce
the role of government in defining and enforcing" the rules of society. Brazil, supra note 6, at 305.
The outcomes of ADR will remain secret, depriving society of information about curent
developments and of the ability to shape public opinion. Id. Innovations such as ADR should be
defined by broad social goals rather than self-interest. Posner, supra note 285, at 368.
323. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1089. This view contrasts with those who consider the purpose of the
legal system to be management of Americans' litigious nature by ending disputes as expeditiously aspossible. Id.
324. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1085. Many disputes cannot be resolved by enhanced communication
and quick settlement. Edwards, supra note 56, at 678. When conflicts in basic values are involved,
compromise may be impossible. Id.
325. Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HASTINcS L.J. 239, 295 (1987). Dispute resolution answers a public need. Id. at 303.
Appeasing individuals can satisfy a broader public interest because quick, consistent decisions can
maintain the peace.
326. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1075.
327. 1& Fiss argues that settlement may not be preferable to judgment. Id.
328. 1I at 1078. Such situations are common when suits involve corporations, stockholders,
unions, etc. Id at 1078 n.17. Much federal litigation involves the government and requires
determining a spokesperson with the requisite authority. Id. at 1079.
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between the parties which can affect the presentation of the issues and
willingness to be assertive.32 9  Litigant access to resources may vary.30
The party without adequate finances may not be able to engage in pro-
tracted negotiation or may settle to receive an award quickly.3 3 . Interpre-
tations of law and post-settlement supervision are often necessary but
hindered by private settlements. 32 Thus, parties may consent to a settle-
ment but may lack adequate participation, or may be uninformed and
unprotected.3 3
Rather than providing additional options for legal services, ADR may
restrict access to the courts by exerting pressure to settle or imposing
preconditions on court access. In one study, all trial judges in California
were surveyed over a three month period.334 There was near unanimous
preference for more cases to settle, for cases to settle sooner, and for
settlements to maximize fairness and creativity.335 Although the judiciary
was in favor of greater efficiency through settlement, critics fear that it
may be at the cost of abandoning judicial duties.336 Faced with this pros-
pect, settlement is recommended merely as a technique for controlling
crowded dockets, one that should be "managed rather than
encouraged. ' 337
Users of ADR assume that the decision ends the dispute. They tend
to minimize the important remedial function of lawsuits.3 3 ' Actually, the
judgment merely marks a change in the balance of power in a continuing
contest.3 3 9 Settlement is inviting because it avoids trial, yet it provides no
329. E.g., id. at 1076-77. The informality of the process allows decisions to be made without the
procedural safeguards which less powerful groups may need. See Emery & Wyer, supra note 33, at
477-78 (suggesting that independent legal advice is necessary before initiating some mediations). But
see Kelly, supra note 35, at 80 (suggesting that mediation helped women's overall ability to be
assertive).
330. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1076. A disadvantage in the ability to collect and analyze information
will influence predictions and expectations regarding the outcome of the dipute. Id.
331. Id. Fiss is doubtful that contingency fees or low cost legal services for financially
disadvantaged clients will equalize resources. Id. at 1077. Contingency fees do not help defendants,
and plaintiffs must find attorneys willing to accept their cases on that basis. Id.
332. Id. at 1087.
333. Those encouraging ADR respond that the facilitator can encourage participation and lessen
the impact of disparity by using techniques compatible with the particular ADR process being used.
Such techniques include focusing the discussion and refraining answers in mediation and calling
selective witnesses in SJTs. Although there is controversy about problems of power imbalance in
mediation, most participants believe their agreements are fair. Roehl & Cook, supra note 68, at 44.
334. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 355.
335. Id. at 357 (citing Barrett et al., Use of ADR in California Courts, Findings and Proposals:
Report to the Judicial Council of California Advisory Committee on Dispute Resolution, Appendix 1 at
15 (1991)). See also id. at 415 (providing a summary of the judges' responses).
336. E.g., Brazil, supra note 6, at 305. Because the decision-makers in ADR are not screened or
accountable to the public, quality is sacrificed. Id.
337. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1075. Fiss compares settlement to plea bargaining. Consent may be
coerced, parties lacking the authority to consumate the agreement may negotiate, and justice may be
minimized. Id.
338. Id. at 1082.
339. Id. For example, much of the litigation in domestic relations cases, the largest category on
state court dockets, occurs after the entry of the decree. Id. at 1083 n.26.
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record of the situation at the time the settlement negotiations occur.a40
When a dispute resurfaces, it is difficult to assess the request and recom-
mend action compatible with what the parties had foreseen.
Due to the many variables involved, it is impossible to adequately
substantiate the claim that ADR results in more efficient case manage-
ment.a Even if documented, speed and cost do not necessarily equal
quality.341 Settlement reduces direct costs at that point in time but
potentially increases costs in the future.a 3 Future costs include relitiga-
tion as well as possible legal errors. 3" Fewer decisions generate less pre-
cedent for predicting results and guiding behavior)3'4 As social policy,
proposing ways to minimize the cost of litigation may be preferable to
increasing settlements . 46  Critics contend that if cost-savings cannot be
demonstrated, then ADR unnecessarily increases the cost to the public by
adding an additional process.347 However, each process has benefits and
disadvantages, and any thorough analysis must weigh both.'3 s
3. Mandatory vs. Voluntary ADR
Compulsory ADR extends throughout the state and federal adminis-
trative and judicial systems a-49 Yet, the wisdom of mandatory arbitration
and mediation is questioned. Robert Coulson, president of the American
340. Fiss, supra note 7, at 1084. Settlement also makes enforcement more difficult. Id. Courts
are hesitant to enlist coercive powers to enforce agreements made by the parties. Id. Procedures
developed for policing settlement when groups or organizations are involved have generally failed to
consider obtaining the necessary consent or approval. Id. at 1081-82.
341. E.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 9 (citations omitted).
342. Id. at 10. Progress through the legal system cannot be accurately measured by the number
of cases completed. See Posner, supra note 285, at 388 (opining that reduction of total costs is the
ultimate objective).
343. Posner, supra note 285, at 388.
344. Id. Posner rates procedural methods according to their economic value. Id. at 388 n.33.
345. Id. at 388. If settlement merely represses grievances, critics say the purpose of legal
redress is thwarted. Luban, supra note 2, at 383.
346. Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and
Effective Processes, 103 HAiv. L. REV. 1086, 1095 (1990) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The public may
pay more in the present, but the cost is worth the long-term changes in social justice. Id.
347. Id. Others consider that the cost of amicable dispute resolution is worth the expense to
taxpayers. Id. See also Posner, supra note 285, at 388-89. If costs are lowered, the number of cases
filed may increase. Id. Posner suggests raising the amount in controversy required for diversity cases,
increasing filing fees, and expanding state court duties rather than attempting to reduce the demand
for federal services. Id. at 389.
348. Cost-effectiveness is a measurement technique used when specific goals cannot be
measured in dollars and when resources must be maximized. Henry Levin, Cost-Benefit and Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis, in EVALUATION PRACrICE IN REVIEW 83, 85 (David Cordray et al. eds., 1987).
For example, the social goals of a victim-offender program cannot be completely described by afinancial statement. Cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis may be used to make informed
decisions about alternatives. Id. at 83. See id. at 83-84 (describing this type of analysis).349. E.g., Katz, supra note 7, at 1. ADR has been borrowed and incorporated from the private
sector. Id. Washington's Superior Court the local court for the nation's capital, established ADR in
1985. Settling Out of Court: Altenative Dpute Resolution, C.Q. RESEARCHER, May2, 1992, at447 [her inafter Settling Out Of Court: ADR]. California requires couples to mediate before filing a
divorce action. Id. Disputes under $10,000 require arbitration in Pennsylvania. ld. ADR is
praeticed in over 400 local court systems nationally. Id.
[Vol. 70:381
ADR: To BE OR...?
Arbitration Association comments, "Mandatory ADR verges on coercion.
It hasn't simplified things; it's made them more complex."as Even when
voluntary, the process is coercive. 15'
Approximately 80% of the participants in Washington, D.C.'s local
court arbitration program are satisfied with the process whether or not
they accept the recommended settlement. The program is voluntary, but
critics say there is an element of coercion: "There is an implicit threat
that the situation will be worse if you come back to court.' 'as2
The arguments against espousing settlement are even more compel-
ling when considered in conjunction with compulsory ADR. 53 Arbitrary
and unsatisfactory decisions due to inadequate participation, judicial over-
reaching, and lack of resources may diminish fairness.' Parties may be
forced to deplete limited resources at the arbitration hearing.ass Unsatis-
factory results may not be redressed when the system inhibits and penal-
izes further action.as6 The combination of compulsory ADR and
persuasion to settle may legitimize an inferior system of justice.s 7
Judges are generally positive about court-annexed programs reducing
the cost of litigation, providing speedier resolution, and reducing the
number of cases going to trial.3 58 There are reservations, however. Rules
and procedures, due process, and equal protection may be devalueda 59
ADR may become a barrier to accessing the legal system. Delay can be
significant. Conversely, speed in the ADR process can destroy the devel-
opment of evidence, especially when discovery is shortened.3 1 Presenta-
tion of evidence not generally permitted may prejudice the outcome at a
subsequent trial.36' Public accountability is forfeited when mediators and
arbitrators do not keep public records of their cases. 362 The role of judges
in all forms of compulsory ADR is not well-defined. Clients' reactions are
controlled by attorneys' opinions; judges are too interested in clearing the
350. Settling Out of Court: ADR, supra note 349, at 447 (quoting Austin Sarat).
351. Id.
352. Id. (quoting Austin Sarat).
353. See Eisele, supra note 8, at 36. Coerced settlement is the goal of compulsory ADR. Id.
354. See Katz, supra note 7, at 50-51.
355. Eisele, supra note 8, at 37.
356. Id. Judge Eisele criticizes the practice of setting arbitration awards at a level that will make
it encomomically unfeasible for parties to demand trial de novo. Id. at 36.
357. Katz, supra note 7, at 5. Civil rights plaintiffs may be particularly disadvantaged, id. at 5
n.21, and their civil rights may be at risk in mandatory court-annexed programs. Eisele, supra note 8,
at 40.
358. E.g., Katz, supra note 7, at 50.
359. Eisele, supra note 8, at 34-35. See also Judge Rodney S. Webb, Court-Annexed "ADR"-A
Dissent, 70 N.D. L. REV. 230-34 (1994) (suggesting that court-annexed ADR may be
unconstitutional).
360. E.g., Webber, supra note 272, at 1519. Constraints on discovery may reward the attorney
who waits for the opponent to provide information and may contribute to inaccurate decision-making.
Id.
361. Id. at 1515-16. The flexibility permits potentially serious errors. Id.
362. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 42-43.
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docket.36 The satisfaction of judges, parties, and attorneys who use
mandatory court-annexed programs does not legitimize their use."' 4
Traditional standards of fairness and due process must override personal
preference.3
The question of whether compulsory ADR is successful elicits mixed
responses. 3e Judges are generally positive, and empirical studies indicate
participant satisfaction.367 However, answers about cost and time savings
are not definitive. There is little conclusive data indicating that ADR
saves significant time and money for participants or the legal system. 36
Mandatory arbitration diverts large numbers of cases from the courts,369
but given the high rate of settlement in general, it is impossible to deter-
mine how many would have settled without ADR or similar intervention.
Requiring an additional procedure adds a new layer of administrative
expense for courts and costs for the participants. SJTs and arbitration may
be less expensive than trial, but they are more costly than ordinary settle-
ment negotiations.37 °
No arbitration method is completely mandatory-all have exemp-
tions.37' Parties may demand trial de novo. Disincentives discourage this
demand but apparently not to a significant degree. Presumably, if volun-
tary programs were completely effective, they would be preferred by eve-
ryone.37 However, providing ADR as an option has not been particularly
363. Eisele, supra note 8, at 40. ADR is predicated upon the incompetence of trial lawyers and
the self-interest of judges. Id.
364. Id. at 39.
365. Id.
366. Katz, supra note 7, at 45.
367. Id. at 45-46.
368. Id. at 46. A series of mandatory arbitration studies failed to confirm that efficiency was
increased. Id. at 47. Arbitration is more likely to replace settlement than trial. Id. One discouraging
review reported that a mandatory New Jersey automobile negligence program increased disposition
time and resulted in no significant reduction of the trial rate. Id. at 47 (citing Robert J. MacCoun,
Unintended Consequences of Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JusT. SYs. 1.
229, 239 (1991)). Mixed results regarding efficiency have been reported and gains have been only
moderate. Id. at 47 (citing Keith 0. Boyum, Afterword: Does Court-Annexed Arbitration "Work'?, 14
JUST. Sys. J. 244, 245-47 (1991)).
369. Katz, supra note 7, at 45 (citing McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 (E.D. Ky.
1988) as an example).
370. Webber, supra note 272, at 1520. An opinion survey of 200 early neutral evaluation (ENE)
participants (a procedure in which lawsuits are screened by a neutral third party who presents an
opinion of the case and, if justified, a suggested award) reported that substantial amounts of money
were not saved, but the procedure was not considered expensive. David I. Levine, Perspective of
Lawyers, Clients, and Evaluators Detailed in Survey of Early Neutral Evaluation, ALTERNATIVE
DISPuTE RESOLUTION: PRACrIcE AND PERSPECTsVES 87, 87-88 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990).
ENE was more effective than the settlement conference in promoting settlement. Id. at 89. Of the
attorneys that settled, 88.2% thought ENE helped; of attorneys that did not, 61.4% thought ENE
helped develop the case. Id.
371. MEERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 119.
372. Id.
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successful, and if enough cases are not attracted, the programs will not
have an effect.3
73
Courts continue to address the legitimacy of mandatory ADR. For
example, the Sixth Circuit recently ruled that parties may not be com-
pelled to use alternative dispute resolution methods.374 Also, the dissent
to a Supreme Court decision contended that compulsory arbitration con-
flicts with the power to authorize broad injunctive relief to redress certain
claims. 375 The proper balance between achieving efficiency and requiring
compulsory participation in ADR remains unresolved for both social and
legal theorists.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Is ADR Successful? No
ADR is a poorly developed program that will only create new
problems if fully enacted.37 6 It is "a technocratic solution to a non-tech-
nocratic problem," one that "trades justice for harmony.-3 77  It begins
with a defined problem and underestimates the pressure to ignore griev-
ances. 378 Advocates assume that dispute resolution is a rational process in
which parties weigh the relative choices available to them.379 Yet, ADR
services are not sought voluntarily. It is a misconception to maintain that
disputants merely want disputes resolved efficiently and are unconcerned
about how that occurs.38 °
ADR does not provide a real alternative. Observational studies have
indicated a remarkable degree of similarity between litigants' reactions in
court settings and in mediation. 381 ADR is useful only if nonjudicial dis-
373. Id. at 120. Judges' satisfaction with arbitration was related to the number of cases diverted.
Id. When less judicial involvement was required before arbitration, judges were correspondingly
more pleased. Id. Thus, if judges must participate in the selection of cases or administration of the
arbitration program, burdens, or perceived burdens, will not be decreased. Id.
374. See Stephanie B. Goldberg, Courts Can't Order ADR, 79 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1993, at 77
(discussing In re NLO Inc., 5 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 1993)). A SJT had been ordered and refusal to
participate was subject to sanctions. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that courts are not authorized by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, to order mandatory participation in ADR. Id.
Alternatively, relying on the inherent authority of the court to legitimize such an order is an
"'imprudent expansion of the judicial power.'" Id. Participation must be voluntary. Id.
375. Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. at 1660 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Commercial arbitration is limited to
specific disputes. Id. The holding in Gihmer thus frustrates the purpose of the ADEA and
"eviscerates the important role played by an independent judiciary in eradicating employment
discrimination." Id. at 1660-61.
376. Austin Sarat, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Wrong Solution, Wrong Problem, NE:w
DIREC'rONS IN LIABILITY LAw 162, 162 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
377. Settling Out of Court: ADR, supra note 350, at 447.
378. Sarat, supra note 376, at 168-69.
379. Id. at 170-71.
380. Id. at 171.
381. Id. at 172 (citing Susan Silbey & Sally Merry, Interpretive Processes in Mediation and
Courts 3-4 (1986) (unpublished manuscript)). Merry and Silbey observed mediations and
adjudications of minor disputes over a three-year period. Id. They concluded that the processes are
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pute resolution methods are distinct from judicial ones, if some methods
are more preferable than others for resolving certain types of disputes,
and if these disputes can be identified and assigned to the optimal
method of resolution. There is, however, no consensus on when these
conditions exist.
ADR is not the answer to demands for more efficiency. ADR has
had too little impact on overcrowded dockets and the expenses of litiga-
tion. It does not necessarily reduce caseloads. ADR generally replaces
ordinary settlement negotiation instead of replacing trials. It is a useful
management tool, but other procedures are equally or more effective.382
For example, greater emphasis on judicial techniques, such as discovery
control and assertive use of deadlines, is more productive. 3s3
Pitfalls of the ADR process include voluntariness (consent is consid-
ered a prerequisite to success),3s proper timing, resources (preparation
for litigation must continue because negotiations may fail),3s and repeti-
tiveness.38 6 In addition to these generic criticisms, each type of ADR
encounters criticism specific to its format. For example, critics claim that
judicial functions are inappropriately relinquished in SJTs and the une-
qual status of participants in mediation is reflected in their agreements.
2. Is ADR Successful? Yes
The use of ADR should increase because disputes are not being
resolved by present means,- s ' and society is hurt by the lack of readily
available, reasonably priced methods for resolving disputes.388 ADR is
often disguised in everyday contexts, and thus the use of and need for
ADR may be greater than the public assumes.38 9 People with resources
similar. Id. Parties develop strategies to manage trouble and struggle to gain control of the situation.
Both settings blended formal and informal decision-making. Id.
382. Katz, supra note 7, at 52.
383. See id. (noting that enthusiasm for ADR is waning and that statutes such as the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 have mandated experiments in local rlemaking for better judicial management).
384. David C. Bergmann, ADR. Resolution or Complication, 131 Pua. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 15,
1993, at 21.
385. Id. at 22. Resources were used in ADR "which would have been better spent on preparing
for litigation." Id.
386. Id. "Forums and rights" need coordination so that one problem is not addressed multiple
times. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self-
Interest Lie?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 429 (1989) (citing Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns:
A Changing of the Guard., 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 24-25 (1988)).
387. Disputes that are not resolved may be ignored because of Americans' high mobility and the
relative ease of avoiding one another. Richard Danzig & Michael Lowy, Everyday Disputes and
Mediation in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 675, 679-80
(1975). On the other hand, Felstiner argues that avoidance is not detrimental because parties chose
that option after considering the costs of confrontation. William L. F. Felstiner, Influences of Social
Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 63, 84-85 (1974). If adjudication and
mediation processing are possible, avoidance of disputes is costly; when avoidance is acceptable, it is
difficult to encourage parties to utilize either. Id.
388. Danzig, supra note 387, at 691.
389. Id. at 682-83.
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hire third-party neutrals in the form of therapists, lawyers, and other pro-
fessionals to help resolve problems. Those without access to private
assistance frequently attempt to compel public officials, especially the
police, into an ADR role.390 Other disputes may remain unresolved.
ADR provides a superior alternative for the kinds of cases that courts
mismanage because of its dependence upon the information presented,
lack of enforcement power, and limited resources. 391 When surveyed,
judges indicated that mediation could be useful in all kinds of civil
cases, especially for cases that have a high incidence of occurrence.
Moreover, ADR does not compromise dignity.39 Advocates contend that
ADR increases access to justice, improves the perception of fairness, and
enhances client satisfaction and compliance. It promotes cost-efficiency
and time savings, 5 permitting more adjudicative resources to be allo-
cated to cases that require greater attention. To determine whether dis-
putes should be diverted to ADR, proponents suggest considering the
importance of the rights at issue, the probability of error, the need for
finality, and public pressures.396
Adjudication is not essential for justice. Actually, justice is enhanced
by the addition of alternative procedures.3 97 ADR is described as a "no-
lose" alternative with a no-risk approach. 98 Confidence in arbitration as
an option was reinforced by the United States Supreme Court in Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.399 The Court found no inconsis-
tency in allowing grievances involving social policy to be arbitrated
because court resolution also entails decision-making regarding social pol-
390. Id. at 683-84. Most officials are neither trained, motivated, nor rewarded for using
mediation. Id. The need for mediation and its use is often disguised in other contexts and is more
prevalent than assumed. Id. at 682.
391. Sarat, supra note 376, at 164. ADR is expected to be most efficient and effective if no real
dispute exists, for example, in an uncontested divorce, or in instances involving complex, continuing
relationships. Id. at 164-65.
392. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 366.
393. Id. These are "landlord-tenant, small claims, civil harassment, collection, and DUI cases."
Id. However, complex cases should not necessarily be eliminated. See, e.g., Kevin R. Casey, ADR
Hits Homerun in Patent Cases, BARRiSTER, Fall 1993, at 18 (noting that ADR was cost and time
effective in a complicated patent infringement case).
394. Lambros, supra note 264, at 476.
395. E.g., Lambros, supra note 264, at 476. The SJT requires fewer potential jurors than a
tradition trial, uses magistrates effectively, and enhances judges' dispositional powers. Id. at 477.
396. Sarat, supra note 376, at 166-67.
397. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 59. Whether litigants take advantage of additional options
depends upon weighing the loss of some procedures, such as rulings on motions, against gaining the
opportunity for a hearing at an earlier date. Id.
398. Lambros, supra note 264, at 477.
399. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991). Gilmer filed an age discrimination suit in the United States District
Court. Id. at 1651. Respondent sought to compel arbitration. Id. The court denied the motion,
reasoning in part that Congress had not intended to foreclose a judicial forum to ADEA claimants.
Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
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icy.4°  Arbitration does not deprive litigants of a forum,40 1 nor does it
stifle development of the law.402 In response to concerns of being disad-
vantaged by unequal bargaining power, the Gilmer Court responded that
"[m]ere inequality" cannot preclude enforceability of a contractual arbi-
tration clause; cases must be considered on an individual basis.4°3
Although judicial review is limited, "such review is sufficient to ensure
that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute. ''404 The
Court refused to lend credence to unfounded fears about the arbitration
process.
Participants in ADR are satisfied. The most favorable aspects of
ADR "tend not to be cost and speed" but rather fairness and the opportu-
nity for expression. 40 5 ADR may be helpful in several ways by educating
the parties about the costs and benefits of settlement when compared to
litigation, evaluating the value of a case, confronting personal problems
that might interfere with the resolution of the dispute, and by individual-
izing settlements.4" The American Bar Association is enthusiastic about
ADR, stating that it has "the potential to become ... an effective and
cost-expeditious settlement device for attorneys and litigants."
40 7
3. How Can Success Be Measured?
The answer depends on the purpose of ADR, the definitions of suc-
cess or failure, and attainment of the selected criteria.408 Judge Posner
contends that anecdotes, testimonials, impressions, assertions, and glow-
ing reports of ADR are unconvincing. °9 Innovations, including ADR,
require experimentation and rigorous testing. Variables that can be
manipulated and measured for proper experimentation include the use of
400. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652 (1991). Gilmer claimed
that the ADEA fosters broad social policies in addition to addressing individual grievances. Id.
Gilmer further argued that arbitration deprived him of ajudicial forum intended by the ADEA. Id. at
1653.
401. Id. at 1653-54. Justice White noted that Congress included informal methods of decision-
making for the EEOC, and arbitration agreements provide increased options for selecting forums.
Id. (citing Rogriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483 (1989)).
402. Id. at 1655. Gilmer alleged that the absence ot written opinions will result in employers'
concealing discriminatory policies, an inability to obtain adequate review, and stifling of development
of the law. Id.
403. Gilmer was concerned about unequal bargaining power betweeen employers and
employees. Id.
404. Id. at 1655 n.4 (citing Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987)).
405. Katz, supra note 7, at 48-49.
406. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 365. Judges thought that mediation was valuable when the
cost of litigation outweighed the potential award. Id. at 366.
407. Settling Out of Court: ADR, supra note 349, at 447.
408. See John P. Esser, Evaluations of Dispute Processing: We Do Not Know What We Think
and We Do Not Think What We Know, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 499, 547-62 (1989) (providing a
bibliography of ADR evaluations).
409. Posner, supra note 285, at 367.
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alternative methods, the type of lawsuit, the public or private setting, cli-
ent characteristics, and whether the ADR is voluntary or compulsory.
Court-sponsored programs tend to focus evaluations on the speed of reso-
lution; private, commercial sponsors focus evaluations on cost-savings.41°
Both groups have fostered evaluations based on efficiency.
411
Even criteria assumed to reflect success may not be valid. Partici-
pant satisfaction is commonly measured to evaluate success, but it has
been criticized as an unacceptable criterion of social justice, one that
ADR should not be expected to achieve.41 2 Satisfaction of participants
may not accurately reflect social costs; expectations may have been low-
ered; or if a participant is too pleased, the settlement may have been
unfair.41 3 Moreover, the concept of fairness is elusive and difficult to
measure.41 4 Even results obtained do not provide an adequate bench-
mark for comparing ADR to litigation. It is impossible to accurately pre-
dict outcomes following a different type of procedure. Some evaluators
consider the "shadow verdict" the only appropriate comparison.415 How-
ever, because so many cases are settled, others think that the "shadow
bargain," the outcome of fair negotiation, should be the appropriate
416comparison.
There has been an exponential increase in the use of ADR. It will be
useful to determine the types of cases that are most successful with ADR.
Projections of expected increases in certain classifications of cases or
elimination of types of ADR which do not work well can lead to better
allocation of resources. 417 Determining the optimal conditions for ADR
will enhance its use. For example, mediation is the most effective type of
ADR for moderate levels of conflict, high motivation to reach agreement,
requests for mediation by both parties, and equal bargaining power.41s
410. Luban, supra note 2, at 381.
411. The production argument is concerned with efficiency. Id. at 381-82 (citing Mark
Galanter, A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge: Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J. L. &
Soc'y 1, 8 (1985)).
412. Id. at 404.
413. Id. at 404-05. Parties may be satisfied with settlements for inappropriate reasons. judge
Susan Steingass notes that the optimal settlement in a divorce is one that makes neither party happy
but is one that both can accept. Id. at 406.
414. One suggestion is to assess whether outcomes are respected and enforceable.
415. Luban, supra note 2, at 387-88. The shadow verdict is the predicted result of a fair trial;
the shadow bargain is the result of fair negotiations. Id.
416. Id. at 388.
417. See G. Michael Flores, Handling Employee Issues Through Alternate Dispute Resolution,
176 BANKERS MAC., July/Aug. 1993, at 47. Employment litigation will increase over the next decade.
Id. at 48. Cases which involve sexual harassment, discrimination, disability, and termination of
employment are stressful and expensive for both parties, and ADR should be especially helpful. Id.
Other types of cases will be eliminated. For example, one author reports that ADR is ineffective in
utility ratemaldng cases due to problems with the parties' having disparate resources and producing
decisions that may conflict with statutory rules. Bergmann, supra note 384, at 21.
418. Kressel & Pruitt, A Research Perspective, supra note 16, at 402-05. Additionally, mediation
is difficult when resources are scarce because it forecloses bargaining options. Id. at 403-04.
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Combinations of ADR, such as mediation followed by a SJT, may prove to
be the most effective.419
When outcomes are measured, they will affect the evaluation results.
There are few repeated observations over time on compliance and reliti-
gation. Research on the post-ADR functioning of parties is needed, con-
sidering the mixed results to date regarding claims of reduction in
hostility and stress, improved cooperation, and better adjustment.42°
Measuring results immediately after resolution and again at a later date
allows participants to compare their assessment of the settlement after
intervening events and time to process the changes have occurred. How-
ever, the more time that elapses, the more difficult it is to obtain
information.
Practical concerns, such as time and cost, may be addressed by more
rigorous research design. In addition to efficiency, quality must be mea-
sured. Claims that ADR yields better justice because it fosters fundamen-
tal values, personal expression, participation, and less reliance upon
professionals require qualitative evaluation methodologies.42' Measure-
ment of more abstract concerns such as justice, fairness, and social policy
is troublesome. 42  Justice Las been assessed using criteria such as
accountability and fairness.4z' Defining justice and selecting measurable
criteria is likely to stimulate development of acceptable goals for ADR
rather than provide definitive answers to its existence.
4. Suggestions
Selection of ADR will be encouraged if litigants are aware of its avail-
ability and potential benefits. Benefits of ADR include possible cost sav-
ings, expedited resolution, and greater personal participation. To
encourage making an educated selection of ADR, suggestions include
providing brochures to all potential plaintiffs, requiring that attorneys and
clients meet before or soon after filing to discuss ADR, and establishing
financial incentives for the use of ADR, such as reduced filing fees for
parties who attempt ADR before filing.
419. A combination of ADR with adjudication allows participating attorneys to exercise
dichotomous skills of cooperation and confrontation, allowing a greater range of possible techniques
to be utilized.
420. See supra text accompanying notes 89-102 (discussing the lack of uniform results when
measuring psychological changes).
421. Luban, supra note 2, at 382 (citing THE PouIcs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed.,
1982)). The hypothesis that ADR is conducive to greater justice is the quality argument. Id. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 6 (proposing to measure ADR using categories denominated
quantitative-efficiency and qualitative-justice). Evaluations for the different methods of ADR should
be distinct. Id. at 44.
422. See Menzel, supra note 69, 10 (defining fairness).
423. E.g., Umbreit, supra note 18, at 56 (maintaining that involvement of the victim is related to
fairness).
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Participation in ADR can be enhanced by providing clear expecta-
tions to clients and confirming that ADR's purpose and procedure are
understood.424 In addition to providing procedural safeguards and ade-
quate screening procedures, ADR requires meaningful participation.4 25
Thus, attendance and good faith participation of lawyers and principals
with settlement authority should be required.42  Ethical practice also
requires prompt abandonment of the ADR effort if it is ineffective and
causes delay in accessing the legal system.
In terms of timing, referral to ADR should not impede the progress
of other court deadlines.427 Judges almost unanimously support media-
tion before filing the action, but express concerns about starting ADR
before discovery. In no case did judges want ADR to contribute to miss-
ing statute of limitation deadlines.42 ' Efficiency is not the foremost goal
of mediation, but the process should not create unnecessary delay.42 9
Suggestions for enhancing efficiency include a procedure for bypassing
ADR and sending some cases directly to trial and limiting mandatory
ADR to one to two days.430
Determining the most suitable type of ADR will contribute to its
success. ADR is most advantageous when the parties have a continuing
or past relationship, when creative solutions are possible, when only dam-
ages are at issue, when a third-party expert would be helpful for under-
standing scientific or technical issues, and when communication problems
are minimal.431 A comparison of voluntary and compulsory SJTs strongly
suggests that voluntary procedures result in greater diversion of cases and
litigant satisfaction. Identifying factors which enhance voluntary partici-
pation may serve to minimize the expansion of mandatory programs while
addressing the need to divert significant numbers of cases for efficiency.
424. Clients in ENE seemed confused about the procedure. Levine, supra note 370, at 87, 88,
90.
425. Guidelines, supra note 346, at 1095-96.
426. Id. at 1096 The holding in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648
(7th Cir. 1989), suggests that attendance at ADR may be compelled. See Guidelines, supra note 346,
at 1096.
427. Folberg, supra note 5, at 369.
428. Id. at 369-70.
429. Guidelines, supra note 346, at 1102. lime preparing for the SJT is not wasted because the
information and supporting materials that have been developed can be used at trial. Id. at 1102
n.116.
430. Id. at 1102.
431. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 393. A particular type of ADR can be matched with the
problem. In mediation, a neutral third party gathers as much information as possible from each side
and helps generate a range of options. Bureau of National Affairs, Lawyers Get Tips on Using Early
Neutral Evalution From ENE Originator and Experienced Trial Lawyer, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990) 83, 85. In ENE, an
expert evaluates the problem without necessarily considering individual interests. Id. Of these two
methods, mediation would thus be more helpful if there are greater differences and more divergent
problems rather than a single, straightforward issue. Id.
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Optimally, courts should be allowed to order cases to ADR on a case-by-
case evaluation. 43
2
Every judicial system has existing court procedures. To effectively
implement and use alternatives, the bench and bar must learn how ADR
will relate to other case management practices in that jurisdiction. For
example, the mandatory arbitration program in the District of Western
Michigan, which had mandatory arbitration programs with the least
favorable approval rating among the ten federal districts, apparently com-
pared unfavorably with a mediation program that was already functioning
in that jurisdiction.4a' Combinations of alternatives are possible, but they
must complement each other. Western Oklahoma reported the highest
proportion of "strongly approve" ratings from attorneys using court-spon-
sored settlement conferences in conjunction with SJTs.'* 4 The case must
be matched to the procedure and the forum rather than being subjected
to various alternatives and multiple attempts at resolution. There is a
point when efforts to settle are counterproductive, and a trial may be less
burdensome on judicial resources.
Public reactions and publicity are important. Judges have expressed
concern about what public perceptions would be if mediation is more
than a minor addition to the traditional procedures. 36 Judges do not
want ADR to be perceived as a private, expensive alternative to the public
legal system. Alternatively, ADR should not be perceived as a mechanism
for eliminating cases and clients of little value.43 7 To counter possible
concerns about secrecy and the lack of a public record, ADR results could
be registered with the court.438
Standard rules and procedures will enhance fairness. Interviews of
652 citizens indicated that procedural justice, or fairness, positively affects
432. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 390. For example, mandatory mediation in civil cases under
$50,000 and child custody and visitation cases tends to be cost-effective and more satisfactory than
litigation. Id. at 388-89.
Folberg suggests considering a number of factors including the type of case, the relationship
among the parties, the attitudes of counsel, previous settlement discussions, the amount in
controversy, and the availability of ADR. Id. at 391.
Judges suggested experimenting with mandatory mediation for certain cases, such as landlord-
tenant, but noted the lack of information available for determining whether the success in child
custody and visitation cases could be replicated. Id. at 389, 390.
433. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 1, at 131. The original program applied fee sanctions if a
rejected award was not improved at trial. Id. Attorneys complained about having to participate in
both arbitration and mediation. Id.
434. Id. at 132.
435. id.
436. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 367.
437. Imposing additional costs after paying filing fees was considered problematic by some
judges, especially for parties not represented by attorneys and for less wealthy parties. Id.
438. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14, at 42-43. Confidentiality can be maintained if records are
kept but made available only when results or procedures are challenged. Id.
[Vol. 70:381432
ADR: To BE OR .... ?
satisfaction and evaluation. 439 Personal and demographic characteristics
did not affect whether the procedure was considered fair; representation
was the most important factor.440 The meaning of procedural justice may
be part of a cultural belief shared by members of the American society
and expressed in common values.44 This suggests that certain proce-
dures will satisfy demands for fairness regardless of the particular popula-
tion or jurisdiction.
Because ADR lacks the institutionalized power balancing of the judi-
cial system, appropriate ways to monitor the process need to be devel-
oped. Confidentiality requirements make policing some aspects of ADR
difficult. For example, in mediation, a lack of equality between the par-
ties may affect the ability to negotiate. Parties in uncomfortable situations
may only want a quick resolution and may neglect to consider the conse-
quences. Pressure to settle following an arbitration or SJT verdict may
constitute coercion rather than negotiation."4 Thus, parties should be
informed that they cannot be forced to settle and that codes of ethics
forbid settlement coercion.' 3 The quality of services must also be moni-
tored. Judges appraise quality by the number of cases resolved, client
satisfaction, and opinions of the local bench and bar.4"
Critics of ADR question why participation in ADR is minimal if ADR
is so attractive to consumers. Perhaps the public is not as dissatisfied with
the legal system as commonly assumed. Litigants may not be aware of the
alternatives. Attorneys may not suggest ADR for fear that choosing ADR
indicates weakness in their case or because delay brought on by litigation
is strategically favorable.
Participation can be increased by making the procedures mandatory;
however, issues of coercion, judicial overreaching, and "second-class" jus-
tice make this option unacceptable to some. One alternative is to propose
uniform referrals to ADR by statutory classifications with exemptions for
439. Tom Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used to Assess Procedural Justice, 22 LAw
& Soc'v REv. 103, 117-21 (1988).
440. Id. at 132.
441. Id.
442. Pressure in mediation may occur in various ways, such as by threatening further legal
action, reframing statements for particular emphasis, and forcing agreements which sacrifice fairness.
Roehl & Cook, supra note 68, at 45. However, if litigants are informed and are free to abandon the
mediation, advocates of the mediation process do not think a problem will exist. Id.
443. Menzel, supra note 69, at 10 (stating that "all decisions are to be made voluntarily by the
participants themselves") (citing ABA DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: STANDARDS OF PRACTICE
10 (1986)).
444. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 368. The following percentage of judges relied on each
criterion: 84%-the number of cases resolved; 85%-client satisfaction; and 83% and 78%
respectively-judgments of the bench and bar. Id. at 368, nn.107-110. One suggestion is to provide
a list of qualified mediators. North Dakota Administrative Rule 28 provides that a list of qualified
mediators shall be maintained by the presiding judge of each district. N.D.A.R. 28.
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new issues of law or changing precedents. 445 Another is to make only the
provision of information about ADR mandatory. Allowing ADR to be
ordered on a case-by-case basis through judicial discretion could also
increase use of ADR without resort to completely compulsory
programs.4 6
The roles of lawyers in implementing, encouraging, and participating
in ADR are multiple. They serve as advisors, advocates, consultants, and
educators. Because many attorneys are not familiar with ADR, ade-
quately fulfilling these roles may be problematic. 447 Judges' attitudes
toward ADR are dependent upon familiarity; however, a significant
number of judges are unfamiliar with specific ADR procedures. 44 Edu-
cation of the bench and bar, including coordination of ADR with existing
procedures, would be beneficial. Champions of ADR are also needed.
Such a role may be fulfilled by a liaison judge responsible for peer educa-
tion and monitoring of the programs. 449 Leadership at subordinate levels
is also seen as crucial.45° Community participation and support through
funding or volunteers may enhance a sense of public participation, owner-
ship, and acceptance.4 5 '
The. potential of ADR is great, but in order to fulfill its promise, it
must be adequately monitored, measured, and promoted. Is ADR suc-
cessful? It can be if designed in response to the "right" questions.
445. Guidelines, supra note 346, at 1103. Assignment to ADR could be determined by
assessment of individual cases or by predefined categories. Id.
446. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 390.
447. Id. at 383. See Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 29, 43 (1982)
(stating that ADR is not part of most lawyers' traditional repertoire).
448. Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 365.
449. Id. at 398.
450. Richard H. Robinson, EPA Ofcial Reports Little Interest In Effort to Use ADR in
Enforcement, in ALTERNATIVE DIsPUrE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES 146, 148
(Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990). To encourage the use of ADR in agencies, identifying at least one
advocate at each organizational level is recommended. Id. Resistance to ADR may be based on fear
of losing control of a case, lack of understanding ADR, and lack of incentives. Id. (citing Richard H.
Mays, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental Enforcement: A Noble Experiment or a
Lost Cause? 18 ENVrL. L. REP. 10087, March 1988)). See also Marguerite Millhauser, ADR Partner
at Large Law Firm Discusses ADR Services, Lawyers' Varied ADR Roles, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND PERSPECTIVES 199, 200 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990) (establishing
the position of ADR specialist in a law firm to educate and train other attorneys in ADR techniques).
451. See Isolina Ricci, Implementing a Legislative Mandate for Services and Coordination to
California's Court-Connected Family Mediation and Conciliation Courts, 30 FAM. & CONCIuATION
CTS. REV. 169, 173-77 (1992) (planning implementation stategies to satisfy legislation requiring
statewide coordination of family mediation). See also Folberg et al., supra note 5, at 379-407
(proposals for increasing the use of ADR).
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